中级微观经济 学(双语) 20151215.pdf

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1、2015-2016学年上学期第十四次课INTERMEDIATEMICROECONOMICS1授课教师:刘璐/LuLiu2015-2016学年上学期第十四次课CHAPTERTWENTY-EIGHT2GameTheory2015-2016学年上学期第十四次课SOMEAPPLICATIONSOFGAMETHEORYThestudyofoligopolies(industriescontainingonlyafewfirms)Thestudyofcartels;e.g.OPECThestudyofexternalit

2、ies;e.g.usingacommonresourcesuchasafishery.Thestudyofmilitarystrategies.32015-2016学年上学期第十四次课GAMETHEORYGametheorymodelsstrategicbehaviorbyagentswhounderstandthattheiractionsaffecttheactionsofotheragents.Agameconsistsofasetofplayersasetofstrategiesforeachpl

3、ayerthepayoffstoeachplayerforeverypossiblelistofstrategychoicesbytheplayers.42015-2016学年上学期第十四次课TWO-PLAYERGAMESAgamewithjusttwoplayersisatwo-playergame.Wewillstudyonlygamesinwhichtherearetwoplayers,eachofwhomcanchoosebetweenonlytwostrategies.52015-2016学年上学期

4、第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMETheplayersarecalledAandB.PlayerAhastwostrategies,called“Up”and“Down”.PlayerBhastwostrategies,called“Left”and“Right”.Thetableshowingthepayoffstobothplayersforeachofthefourpossiblestrategycombinationsisthegame’spayoffmatrix.620

5、15-2016学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRU(3,9)(1,8)Thisisthegame’sPlayerApayoffmatrix.D(0,0)(2,1)PlayerA’spayoffisshownfirst.PlayerB’spayoffisshownsecond.72015-2016学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRU(3,9)Thisisthe(1,8)game’sPlayerApayoff

6、matrix.D(0,0)(2,1)E.g.ifAplaysUpandBplaysRightthenA’spayoffis1andB’spayoffis8.82015-2016学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRU(3,9)(1,8)Thisisthegame’sPlayerApayoffmatrix.D(0,0)(2,1)AndifAplaysDownandBplaysRightthenA’spayoffis2andB’spayoffis1.92015-201

7、6学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRU(3,9)(1,8)PlayerAD(0,0)(2,1)Aplayofthegameisapairsuchas(U,R)wherethe1stelementisthestrategychosenbyPlayerAandthe2ndisthestrategychosenbyPlayerB.102015-2016学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRU(3,9)(1,8)Pl

8、ayerAD(0,0)(2,1)Whatplaysarewelikelytoseeforthisgame?112015-2016学年上学期第十四次课ANEXAMPLEOFATWO-PLAYERGAMEPlayerBLRIs(U,R)aU(3,9)(1,8)likelyplay?PlayerAD(0,0)(2,1)IfBplaysRightthenA’sbes