[博弈论书籍].notes.for.a.course.in.game.theory,maxwell b. stinchcombe,2002

[博弈论书籍].notes.for.a.course.in.game.theory,maxwell b. stinchcombe,2002

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1、NotesforaCourseinGameTheoryMaxwellB.StinchcombeFallSemester,2002.Unique#29775Chapter0.02Contents0OrganizationalStu 71ChoiceUnderUncertainty91.1Thebasicsmodelofchoiceunderuncertainty..................91.1.1Notation..................................91.1.2Thebasicmodelofchoice

2、underuncertainty..............101.1.3Examples.................................111.2ThebridgecrossingandrescalingLemmas...................131.3Behavior......................................141.4Problems......................................152CorrelatedEquilibriainStaticGame

3、s192.1Generalitiesaboutstaticgames.........................192.2DominantStrategies...............................202.3Twoclassicgames.................................202.4SignalsandRationalizability...........................222.5Twoclassiccoordinationgames.................

4、........232.6SignalsandCorrelatedEquilibria........................242.6.1Thecommonpriorassumption......................242.6.2Theoptimizationassumption......................252.6.3Correlatedequilibria...........................262.6.4Existence..............................

5、...272.7Rescalingandequilibrium............................272.8Howcorrelatedequilibriamightarise......................282.9Problems......................................293NashEquilibriainStaticGames333.1Nashequilibriaareuncorrelatedequilibria...................333.222gam

6、es....................................363Chapter0.03.2.1Threemorestories............................363.2.2Rescalingandthestrategicequivalenceofgames............393.3ThegapbetweenequilibriumandParetorankings...............413.3.1StagHuntreconsidered.........................

7、.413.3.2Prisoners'Dilemmareconsidered....................423.3.3ConclusionsaboutEquilibriumandParetorankings..........423.3.4RiskdominanceandParetorankings..................433.4Otherstaticgames................................443.4.1In nitegames.............................

8、..443.4.2FiniteGames...............................503.5Harsanyi'sinterpretationof

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