Advanced Micro (2) 16a1 Repeated Games

Advanced Micro (2) 16a1 Repeated Games

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时间:2019-07-14

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1、RepeatedGames(I)1Apartfromthechaptersintheconventionaltextbooks,therearesomespecializedbooksonit.Mailath,G.J.,Samuelson,L.(2007).RepeatedGamesandReputations:Long-RunRelationships.OUP.RobertAumann,MichaelMaschler(1995).RepeatedGameswithIncompleteInformation.MITPress.2SomeGeneralD

2、iscussionThemodelofrepeatedgameisdesignedtoexaminethelogicoflongterminteraction.Itcapturestheideathataplayerwilltakeintoaccounttheeffectofhiscurrentbehaviourontheotherplayers’futurebehaviour,andaimstoexplainphenomenalikecooperation,revenge,andthreats.•TheBasicIdeaThebasicideabeh

3、indthetheoryisillustratedbythecaseinwhichtwoindividualsrepeatedlyplaythePrisoner’sDilemma.3ThisgamehasauniqueNashequilibrium,inwhicheachplayerchoosesD;Further,foreachplayertheactionDstrictlydominatestheactionC,sothattherationalebehindtheoutcome(D,D)isverystrong.Despitethis,bothp

4、layerarebetteroffifthey“cooperate”andchooseC.Themainideabehindthetheoryofrepeatedgamesisthatifthegameisplayedrepeatedlythenthemutuallydesirableoutcomeinwhich(C,C)occursineveryperiodisstable,ifeachplayerbelievesthatadefectionwillterminatethecooperation,resultinginasubsequentlossf

5、orhimthatoutweighstheshort-termgain.Theprimaryachievementofthetheoryistoisolatetypesofstrategiesthatsupportmutuallydesirableoutcomesinanygame.4Thetheorygivesusinsightsintothestructureofbehaviourwhenindividualsinteractrepeatedly,structurethatmayinterpretedintermsofa“socialnorm”.T

6、heresultsthatwedescribeshowthatthesocialnormneededtosustainmutuallydesirableoutcomesinvolveseachplayer’s“punishing”anyplayerwhosebehaviourisundesirable.Whenweimposetherequirementembeddedinthenotionofsubgameperfectequilibriumthatthreatsofpunishmentbecredible,thesocialnormsmustens

7、urethatthepunishershaveanincentivetocarryoutthethreatsincircumstancesinwhichthesocialnormrequiresthemtodoso.Inthiscasetheprecisenatureofthepunishmentdependsonhowtheplayersvaluefutureoutcomes.5Sometimesitissufficientthatapunishmentphaselastforalimitedamountoftime,afterwhichthepla

8、yersreturntopursuethemutuallydesirableoutcome;S

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