[博弈论书籍].games.and.information,an.introduction.to.game.theory(4th),eric rasmusen,basil blackwell

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1、GAMESANDINFORMATION,FOURTHEDITIONAnIntroductiontoGameTheoryEricRasmusenBasilBlackwellvContents1(starredsectionsarelessimportant)ListofFiguresListofTablesPrefaceContentsandPurposeChangesintheSecondEditionChangesintheThirdEditionUsingtheBookTheLevelofMathematicsOtherBooksContactInfor

2、mationAcknowledgementsIntroductionHistoryGameTheory’sMethodExemplifyingTheoryThisBook’sStyleNotesPART1:GAMETHEORY1TheRulesoftheGame1.1Definitions1.2DominantStrategies:ThePrisoner’sDilemma1.3IteratedDominance:TheBattleoftheBismarckSea1.4NashEquilibrium:BoxedPigs,TheBattleoftheSexes,a

3、ndRankedCoordina-tion1.5FocalPointsNotesProblems1xxxFebruary2,2000.December12,2003.24March2005.EricRasmusen,Erasmuse@indiana.edu.http://www.rasmusen.org/GIFootnotesstartingwithxxxaretheauthor’snotestohimself.Commentsarewelcomed.vi2Information2.1TheStrategicandExtensiveFormsofaGame2

4、.2InformationSets2.3Perfect,Certain,Symmetric,andCompleteInformation2.4TheHarsanyiTransformationandBayesianGames2.5Example:ThePngSettlementGameNotesProblems3MixedandContinuousStrategies3.1MixedStrategies:TheWelfareGame3.2Chicken,TheWarofAttrition,andCorrelatedStrategies3.3MixedStra

5、tegieswithGeneralParametersandNPlayers:TheCivicDutyGame3.4DifferentUsesofMixingandRandomizing:MinimaxandtheAuditingGame3.5ContinuousStrategies:TheCournotGame3.6ContinuousStrategies:TheBertrandGame,StrategicComplements,andStrate-gicSubsitutes3.7ExistenceofEquilibriumNotesProblems4Dyn

6、amicGameswithSymmetricInformation4.1SubgamePerfectness4.2AnExampleofPerfectness:EntryDeterrenceI4.3CredibleThreats,SunkCosts,andtheOpen-SetProblemintheGameofNui-sanceSuits*4.4RecoordinationtoPareto-dominantEquilibriainSubgames:ParetoPerfectionNotesProblems5ReputationandRepeatedGame

7、swithSymmetricInformation5.1FinitelyRepeatedGamesandtheChainstoreParadox5.2InfinitelyRepeatedGames,MinimaxPunishments,andtheFolkTheorem5.3Reputation:theOne-sidedPrisoner’sDilemma5.4ProductQualityinanInfinitelyRepeatedGamevii*5.5MarkovEquilibriaandOverlappingGenerationsintheGameofCust

8、omerSwitch-ingCosts*5.6Evo