中国上市公司高管股权激励的动机研究

中国上市公司高管股权激励的动机研究

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时间:2019-02-24

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1、AbstractEvenwithintheacademicareaofcorporategovernance,wheremasslveconclusionsconflictwitheachother,thetopicaboutincentives011managersseemslikethemostpuzzlingone.Fromagencytheory’Sperspective,incentivesbasedonfilm’sequityareconsideredasmoreeffectivethanothermechanism

2、sinleadingmanagerstobehaviorintheinterestoftheshareholders.Howev%theexistingempiricalstudiescallnotexplainwhyorwhynotfirmsintendtouseexecutiveequity-basedincentives.InstitutionalbackgroundintlleUScouldbepartofthecausesimpedeprogressofex锄iningdeterminantsofEEI.Besides

3、ahandfulofliteraturesonEEIbeyondtheUS,wefocusonareformofChina’sstockmanetduringrecentyears.Furtherthanthebiggestemergingandtransitionaleconomyaroundtheworldinpastthreedecades,China,scapitalmarketprovidesUSanideallaboratorytoinvestigatethedeterminantsofEElsinceitsuniq

4、ueinstitutionalbackground.Inparticular,whensolvingtheagencycostbetweenshareholdersandmanagers,China’SpartiallyprivatizedstateownedentitiesfaceanmchmoresimilarsituationtothoseinAnglo—SaxoneconomiescomparingwiththoseinGermanyorJapan.Moreover,ourpapershedlightontheactio

5、nsoflistedfirmswhentheydeviatedfromtheirrespectiveoptimalincentivecontractswithmanagers.TothebestofOurknowledge,thisisthefirstempiricalstudytotestthesubstituterelationshipbetweenexecutivecompensationincentiveswithothermeaslesforreducingagencycosts.HereWetakeadvantage

6、oftheinstitutionalfeaturesinChina’Sstockmarketagain.WhetheralistedfirmannouncedEElplanssoonalterrestrictionswereeliminated,ischosenastheproxYvariableforwhetheritdeviatedfromitsoptimalincentivelevelduringpre-reformperiod.Wefirstconductalogisticmodelwithasampleof104EEI

7、casesbetween2006and2008toinvestigatethedeterminantsoflistedfirmsannounceEEl.AccordingtoOurresuIts.forSOEsinstockmarkets,thereisastrongnegativerelationbetweenlistedfirm,sownershipconcentrationandtheprobabilitythatitannounceEEI,aftercontrollingfbrvariouscharacteristics

8、offirmsandCEOs.Wealsofindthetradeoffbetweenriskandincentivewhentheultimateowneroflistedfmnisgovernment,whichhasnotbeensupportedinmo

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