the political economy of income taxation under asymmetric information the two-type case

the political economy of income taxation under asymmetric information the two-type case

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时间:2019-03-08

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1、SERIEs(2012)3:181199DOI10.1007/s13209-011-0047-6ORIGINALARTICLEThepoliticaleconomyofincometaxationunderasymmetricinformation:thetwo-typecaseJohnE.RoemerReceived:30September2010/Accepted:7February2011/Publishedonline:2March2011©TheAuthor(s)2011.ThisarticleispublishedwithopenaccessatSpringe

2、rLink.comAbstractTheapparentubiquityofprogressivetaxationinadvanceddemocracieshasanimatedresearchbypoliticaleconomistsinthepastdecade,butlittleprogresshasbeenmadeinmodelingpoliticalequilibriaovertaxpolicywhenlaborsupplyiselasticwithrespecttotaxation.Here,wepostulateaneconomywithtwoworkert

3、ypes(wagecapacities),inwhichtheunskilledaremorenumerousthantheskilled.Preferencesarequasi-linearinincomeandleisure.Onepoliticalpartyrepresentseachworkertype.Ataxpolicyisanyfeasibleincentive-compatiblemenuofpre-andpost-taxincomesfromwhicheachworkermustchoose.Thispolicyspaceisthree-dimen-si

4、onal.Workersvotestochastically.Theequilibriumconceptforpoliticalcompetitionisparty-unanimityNashequilibrium(PUNE)thus,partiesarebothvote-seekingandrepresentative.Thesetofpoliticalequilibriaischaracterized.Weprovethat,iftheclassofunskilledworkersisnottoolarge(butgreaterthanone-half),thenth

5、erealwaysexistequilibriainwhicharegressivetaxpolicywins.If,however,thatclassissufficientlynumerous,orinequalityissufficientlygreat,thenthevictoryofaprogressivepolicyisguaranteedinallequilibria.AlthoughmassvotinghasnotbeenatopicofSalvadorBarberàsresearch,Iofferthispaperforthisspecialissueinh

6、ishonor,becauseitrepresentsoneoftheunfortunatelyfewattemptstobringtheissueofvoterincentivecompatibilityintothestudyofthepoliticsofincomere-distributionthroughtaxationandincentivecompatibilityhasbeenthecornerstoneofSalvadorsresearchprogram.Iemphasizepolitics,becausetheoptimaltaxationlitera

7、ture,sinceMirrlees(1971),hasaddressedincentivecompatibilitybutasaproblemforthesocialplanner.ThepresentpaperisanattempttostudyMirrleesianconsiderationsinthecontextofpoliticalcompetition.Iamgratefultoananonymousrefereeforacutecommentsonthefirstdraft.J.E.Roemer(B)YaleUn

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