Games_and_Information__An_Introduction_to_Game_Theory.pdf

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1、GAMESANDINFORMATION,FOURTHEDITIONAnIntroductiontoGameTheoryEricRasmusenBasilBlackwellvContents1(starredsectionsarelessimportant)ListofFiguresListofTablesPrefaceContentsandPurposeChangesintheSecondEditionChangesintheThirdEditionUsingtheBookTheLevelofMathematicsOtherBooksContactInformationAckn

2、owledgementsIntroductionHistoryGameTheory’sMethodExemplifyingTheoryThisBook’sStyleNotesPART1:GAMETHEORY1TheRulesoftheGame1.1Definitions1.2DominantStrategies:ThePrisoner’sDilemma1.3IteratedDominance:TheBattleoftheBismarckSea1.4NashEquilibrium:BoxedPigs,TheBattleoftheSexes,andRankedCoordina-tio

3、n1.5FocalPointsNotesProblems1xxxFebruary2,2000.EricRasmusen,Erasmuse@indiana.edu.December12,2003.Footnotesstartingwithxxxaretheauthor’snotestohimself.Commentsarewelcomed.vi2Information2.1TheStrategicandExtensiveFormsofaGame2.2InformationSets2.3Perfect,Certain,Symmetric,andCompleteInformation

4、2.4TheHarsanyiTransformationandBayesianGames2.5Example:ThePngSettlementGameNotesProblems3MixedandContinuousStrategies3.1MixedStrategies:TheWelfareGame3.2Chicken,TheWarofAttrition,andCorrelatedStrategies3.3MixedStrategieswithGeneralParametersandNPlayers:TheCivicDutyGame3.4DifferentUsesofMixing

5、andRandomizing:MinimaxandtheAuditingGame3.5ContinuousStrategies:TheCournotGame3.6ContinuousStrategies:TheBertrandGame,StrategicComplements,andStrate-gicSubsitutes3.7ExistenceofEquilibriumNotesProblems4DynamicGameswithSymmetricInformation4.1SubgamePerfectness4.2AnExampleofPerfectness:EntryDet

6、errenceI4.3CredibleThreats,SunkCosts,andtheOpen-SetProblemintheGameofNui-sanceSuits*4.4RecoordinationtoPareto-dominantEquilibriainSubgames:ParetoPerfectionNotesProblems5ReputationandRepeatedGameswithSymmetricInformation5.1FinitelyRepeatedGamesandtheChainstoreParadox5.2InfinitelyRepeatedGames,

7、MinimaxPunishments,andtheFolkTheorem5.3Reputation:theOne-sidedPrisoner’sDilemma5.4ProductQualityinanInfinitelyRepeatedGamevii*5.5MarkovEquilibriaandOverlappingGenerationsintheGameofCustomerSwitch-ingCosts*5.6EvolutionaryEquilibrium:TheHawk-DoveGameN