Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation

《Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。

1、JournalofUrbanEconomics69(2011)136–147ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirectJournalofUrbanEconomicswww.elsevier.com/locate/jueCompetitioninlawenforcementandcapitalallocationab,*NicolasMarceau,SteeveMongrainaUniversitéduQuébecàMontréalandCIRPÉE,Départementdesscienceséconom

2、iques,CP8888,SuccursaleCentre-Ville,Montréal,Québec,CanadaH3C3P8bSimonFraserUniversity,DepartmentofEconomics,8888UniversityDrive,Burnaby,BC,CanadaV5A1S6articleinfoabstractArticlehistory:Thispaperstudiesinter-jurisdictionalcompetitioninthefightagainstcrimeanditsimpactonocc

3、upa-Received9May2008tionalchoiceandtheallocationofcapital.Inaworldwherecapitalismobile,jurisdictionsareinhabitedRevised7July2010byindividualswhochoosetobecomeeitherworkersorcriminals.Becausethereturnofthetwooccupa-Availableonline14July2010tionsdependsoncapital,andbecause

4、investmentincapitalinajurisdictiondependsonitscrimerate,thereisabi-directionalrelationshipbetweencapitalinvestmentandcrimewhichmayleadtocapitalJELclassification:concentration.Byinvestingincostlylawenforcement,ajurisdictionmakesthechoiceofbecomingaK42criminallessattractive

5、,whichinturnreducesthenumberofcriminalsandmakesitsterritorymoreR12secure.ThisincreasedsecurityincreasestheattractivenessofthejurisdictionforinvestorsandthiscanKeywords:eventuallytranslateintomorecapitalbeinginvested.WecharacterizetheNashequilibria—someentail-Crimeingasym

6、metricoutcome,othersanasymmetricone—andstudytheirefficiency.OccupationalchoiceÓ2010ElsevierInc.Allrightsreserved.CapitallocationLawenforcement1.Introductionitieshasbeensuggested.Freemanetal.(1996)andHelsleyandStrange(1999)suggestthatcongestioninenforcementcanexplainSecuri

7、tymatterswhenitcomestoinvestmentdecisions.In-thesephenomena,asmorecriminalscandilutetheprobabilityofdeed,capitalownersprefertoinvestwherecrimeratesarelowercaptureandconviction.ManyeconomistslikeSah(1991),Glaeserbecausethelikelihoodofbeingdeprivedofthereturnontheiretal.(1

8、996)orSilverman(2004),arguethatsocialinteractionsof1investmentislower.Adjacentlocalauthorities,respondi