它和欧洲各国之中央银行的关系

《它和欧洲各国之中央银行的关系》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在行业资料-天天文库。

1、ChapterSevenTHESTRUCTUREOFCENTRALBANKSANDTHEFEDERALRESERVESYSTEMPartIIICentralBankingandtheConductofMonetaryPolicyFormalStructureoftheFedFederalReserveDistrictsInformalStructureoftheFedCentralBankIndependenceFactorsmakingFedindependent1.MembersofBoardhavelongterms2.Fe

2、disfinanciallyindependent:ThisismostimportantFactorsmakingFeddependent1.CongresscanamendFedlegislation2.PresidentappointsChairmenandBoardmembersandcaninfluencelegislationOverall:FedisquiteindependentCentralBankIndependenceOtherCentralBanks1.BankofCanadaandBankofJapan:

3、fairdegreeofindependence,butnotallonpaper2.BankofEnglandandBankofJapanmademoreindependentin1997and1998,respectively.3.EuropeanCentralBankmostindependent4.Trendtogreaterindependence它和歐洲各國之中央銀行的關係，就如同美國Fed的架構ExplainingCentralBankBehaviorTheoryofBureaucraticBehavior1.Isa

4、nexampleofprincipal-agentproblem2.BureaucracyoftenactsinowninterestImplicationsforCentralBankBehavior:1.Acttopreserveindependence：如預算不讓國會控制2.Trytoavoidcontroversy:oftenplaysgames3.SeekadditionalpoweroverbanksWith總統與國會如report最有利之M指標，或常修正M目標或不願意將FOMCreport公布如：1987將reser

5、verequirement擴及至non-memberbankExplainingCentralBankBehaviorShouldFedBeIndependent?CaseFor:1.IndependentFedlikelyhaslongerrunobjectives,politiciansdon't:evidenceisthatgetbetterpolicyoutcomes2.Avoidspoliticalbusinesscycle3.Lesslikelybudgetdeficitswillbeinflationary如：通膨

6、短期目標：失業率、利率選前採寬鬆政策Budgetdeficit政府發債叫央行買公債通膨ExplainingCentralBankBehaviorCaseAgainst:1.Fedmaynotbeaccountable2.Hinderscoordinationofmonetaryandfiscalpolicy3.Fedhasoftenperformedbadly外交、國防是否也該獨立?誰來監督Fed?CentralBankIndependenceandMacroPerformancein17Countries