the market for reputations as an incentive mechanism.pdf

the market for reputations as an incentive mechanism.pdf

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时间:2019-03-05

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1、TheMarketforReputationsasanIncentiveMechanismAuthor(s):StevenTadelisSource:TheJournalofPoliticalEconomy,Vol.110,No.4(Aug.,2002),pp.854-882Publishedby:TheUniversityofChicagoPressStableURL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078538Accessed:08/10/201020:34YouruseoftheJSTORarchiveindicatesyourac

2、ceptanceofJSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUse,availableathttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.JSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUseprovides,inpart,thatunlessyouhaveobtainedpriorpermission,youmaynotdownloadanentireissueofajournalormultiplecopiesofarticles,andyoumayusecontentinth

3、eJSTORarchiveonlyforyourpersonal,non-commercialuse.Pleasecontactthepublisherregardinganyfurtheruseofthiswork.Publishercontactinformationmaybeobtainedathttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress.EachcopyofanypartofaJSTORtransmissionmustcontainthesamecopyrightnotice

4、thatappearsonthescreenorprintedpageofsuchtransmission.JSTORisanot-for-profitservicethathelpsscholars,researchers,andstudentsdiscover,use,andbuilduponawiderangeofcontentinatrusteddigitalarchive.Weuseinformationtechnologyandtoolstoincreaseproductivityandfacilitatenewformsofscholarship.F

5、ormoreinformationaboutJSTOR,pleasecontactsupport@jstor.org.TheUniversityofChicagoPressiscollaboratingwithJSTORtodigitize,preserveandextendaccesstoTheJournalofPoliticalEconomy.http://www.jstor.orgTheMarketforReputationsasanIncentiveMechanismStevenTadelisStanfordUniversityReputationalca

6、reerconcernsprovideincentivesforshort-livedagentstoworkhard,butitiswellknownthattheseincentivesdisappearasanagentreachesretirement.Thispaperinvestigatestheeffectsofamarketforfirmreputationsonthelifecycleincentivesoffirmownerstoexerteffort.Adynamicgeneralequilibriummodelwithmoralhaz-ar

7、dandadverseselectiongeneratestwomainresults.First,incentivesofyoungandoldagentsarequantitativelyequal,implyingthatin-centivesare"ageless"withamarketforreputations.Second,goodreputationscannotactaseffectivesortingdevices:inequilibrium,moreableagentscannotoutbidlesseronesinthemarketforg

8、oodre

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