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1、TheMarketforReputationsasanIncentiveMechanismAuthor(s):StevenTadelisSource:TheJournalofPoliticalEconomy,Vol.110,No.4(Aug.,2002),pp.854-882Publishedby:TheUniversityofChicagoPressStableURL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078538Accessed:08/10/201020:34YouruseoftheJSTORarchiveindicatesyourac
2、ceptanceofJSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUse,availableathttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp.JSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUseprovides,inpart,thatunlessyouhaveobtainedpriorpermission,youmaynotdownloadanentireissueofajournalormultiplecopiesofarticles,andyoumayusecontentinth
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5、ormoreinformationaboutJSTOR,pleasecontactsupport@jstor.org.TheUniversityofChicagoPressiscollaboratingwithJSTORtodigitize,preserveandextendaccesstoTheJournalofPoliticalEconomy.http://www.jstor.orgTheMarketforReputationsasanIncentiveMechanismStevenTadelisStanfordUniversityReputationalca
6、reerconcernsprovideincentivesforshort-livedagentstoworkhard,butitiswellknownthattheseincentivesdisappearasanagentreachesretirement.Thispaperinvestigatestheeffectsofamarketforfirmreputationsonthelifecycleincentivesoffirmownerstoexerteffort.Adynamicgeneralequilibriummodelwithmoralhaz-ar
7、dandadverseselectiongeneratestwomainresults.First,incentivesofyoungandoldagentsarequantitativelyequal,implyingthatin-centivesare"ageless"withamarketforreputations.Second,goodreputationscannotactaseffectivesortingdevices:inequilibrium,moreableagentscannotoutbidlesseronesinthemarketforg
8、oodre