代理成本和股权结构[外文翻译]

代理成本和股权结构[外文翻译]

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1、外文翻译AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructureMaterialSource:THEJOURNALOFFINANCE•VOL.LV,NO.1•FEBRUARY2000page83-87Author:JAMESS.ANG,REBELA.COLE,andJAMESWUHLINI.AgencyCostsamongSmallBusinessesWhencomparedtopubliclytradedfirms,smallbusinessescomeclosesttothetypeoffirmsdepictedinthestylizedtheoreti

2、calmodelofagencycostsdevelopedbyJensenandMeckling(1976).Atoneextremeofownershipandmanagementstructuresarefirmswhosemanagersown100percentofthefirm.Thesefirms,bytheirdefinition,havenoagencycosts.Attheotherextremearefirmswhosemanagersarepaidemployeeswithnoequityinthefirm.Inbetweenarefirms

3、wherethemanagersownsome,butnotall,oftheirfirm’sequity.Agencycostsarisewhentheinterestsofthefirm’smanagersarenotalignedwiththoseofthefirm’sowner(s),andtaketheformofpreferenceforon-the-jobperks,shirking,andmakingself-interestedandentrencheddecisionsthatreduceshareholderwealth.Themagnitud

4、eofthesecostsislimitedbyhowwelltheownersanddelegatedthirdparties,suchasbanks,monitortheactionsoftheoutsidemanagers.Toillustrate,considerthosefirmswhereasingleownercontrols100percentofthestockbuthiresanoutsidertomanagethebusiness.Ontheonehand,agencycostsmaybesmallbecausethesoleownercani

5、nternalizeallmonitoringcostsandhastherighttohireandfirethemanager.Morespecifically,suchanownerincurs100percentofthemonitoringcostsandreceives100percentoftheresultingbenefits.Ontheotherhand,thesoleownermaynotbeabletomonitorperfectlyforthesamereasonsthatheorshehiredanoutsidemanager,sucha

6、slackoftimeorability.Ownersofsmallfirmstypicallylackfinancialsophistication,andmaynotbecapableofperformingrandomauditsorfullyunderstandingtheoperatingorfinancialresults.Consequently,thesefirmsincurresidualagencycosts.Ifthesecostsaresignificant,theymustreflectafailureoftheowner’smonitor

7、ingactivities.Potentialexplanationsforthisfailurearelaxmonitoringbytheownersandthelackofanadequatemonitoringtechnologyavailablefortheowners.Inthiscase,theseparationofthemanagementfunction(initiationandimplementation)versusthecontrolfunctionbynonmanagingowners/shareholders(ratificatio

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