eco/game theory

eco/game theory

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时间:2019-05-08

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1、Eco514/GameTheoryEco514—GameTheoryTheTremblingHand:Normal-FormAnalysisandExtensive-FormImplicationsMarcianoSiniscalchiJanuary17><0,2<0<0<0Introduction:InvarianceIntheirseminalcontribution,VonNeumannandMorgensternarguethatthenormalformofagamecontainsall“strategicallyrelevant”informa

2、tion.Thisview,notewell,doesnotinvalidateortrivializeextensive-formanalysis;rather,itleadsthosewhoembraceittobesuspiciousofextensive-formsolutionconceptswhichyielddifferentpredictionsindistinctextensivegamessharingthesamenormal(orreducednormal)form.Solutionconceptswhichdonotyielddif

3、ferentpredictionsforsuchgamesarecalledinvariant.Thesupposed“strategicsufficiencyofthenormalform”alsomotivatedthesearchfornormal-formsolutionconceptswhichexhibit“nice”propertiesineveryextensive-formas-sociatedwithagivennormal-formgame.ThemainproponentofthislineofresearchisJ.F.Merten

4、s.Inmyopinion,whetherornotthenormalformcontainsall“strategicallyrelevant”informationdependscruciallyonthesolutionconceptonewishestoapply.Thisisactuallyarathertrivialpoint,butIamafraiditwasoverlookedinthedebateonthesufficiencyofthenormalform.Forinstance,inordertocomputetheminmaxvalu

5、eofagame,oneonlyneedstolookatstrategiesandpayoffsassociatedwithstrategyprofiles;theinformationconveyedbytheextensiveformofthegame(ifsuchinformationisatallprovided)isirrelevantasfarastheminmaxvaluecalculationisconcerned.SinceVonNeumannandMorgensternweremostlyconcernedwithminmaxvalue

6、s,thenormalformwasindeedsufficientfortheirpurposes.TheargumentreadilyextendstoNashequilibriumanalysis.However,assoonasonewishestorestricttheattentiontosequentialequilibria,itisclearthatthenormalformisnotsufficienttocarryouttheanalysis.Quitesimply,theformalnotionof“normal-formgame”d

7、oesnotincludeaspecificationofinformationsets!Thispointismoresubtlethatitappears.Youwillrememberthat,givenanextensivegameΓanditsnormalformG,wedefined,foreachinformationsetI,thecollectionof1strategyprofileswhichreachI,S(I).Now,thelatterisanormal-formobject:itissimplyasetofstrategies.

8、Thekeypointisthat,inordert

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