experimental economics ostromwalkergardner

experimental economics ostromwalkergardner

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时间:2018-02-09

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1、CovenantsWithandWithoutaSword:Self-GovernanceisPossibleOstrom,Walker,andGardner(APSR1992)SummarySoFarTheorypredictsthatpeopleshouldbehaveanti-sociallywheneveritincreasestheirpayoffs,potentiallyattheexpenseofotherplayersInrepeatedvoluntarycontributiongames,play

2、erscooperate,butthelevelofcooperationdecreasesovertimeWhatcanwedotoencouragepro-socialbehaviorinallperiodsofarepeatedpublicgoods-stylegame?CovenantsandSwordsOWGshowthatintroducingpre-playcommunicationpost-playsanctioningcanincreasethefrequencyofpro-socialactio

3、nsincommonpoolresourcegamesThemosteffectiveinstitutionispre-playcommunication,combinedwithavoluntarysanctioningmechanismTheGame20roundrepeatedgame,8people/groupIndividualendowmentse=10or25tokensBiggerendowment→biggermistakesPayoffforspendingontheCPRisxixi2Ux

4、=.05e−x.23∑x−.0025∑xiii∑iixiComparetoapublicgoodsgameUx=e−x.4∑xiiiiAnalogytoCookiesCommonPoolPublicGoodsGame=ResourceGame=GettingeveryonetoGettingeveryoneelsebringincookiestostopeatingthepubliccookies!Differences1)Gamehasinteriorsymmetricsocialop

5、timum2)Incentivesareforplayerstooverusethepublicgood,untilthepublicgoodisruined(thinkoflettingtoomanycowsgrazeinHarvardYard...),butplayerspreferthatothersuselessThinkabouthowconclusionsmightdifferinapublicgoodsgameaswegoalong....Game-TheoreticPredictionsSocial

6、optimumisforeachplayertoplay4or5tokensSymmetricNashequilibriumistoplay8(get39%ofsocialoptimumnetyieldfromCPR)SubgameperfectionpredictsweshouldseetheNEineachperiodTreatments1)20+rounds2)10rounds,10mingroupchat,10+rounds3)10rounds,10+roundsw/chatbeforeeach4)10ro

7、unds,10+roundsw/sanctionaftereach5)10rounds,chat,10+roundsw/sanctionaftereach6)10rounds,chat,groupcanvotetoinstallsanctioningmechanism,10+roundsInformationParticipantsknewNumberofpeopleingroupIdenticalendowmentsTableofprofitsasfunctionofgroupinvestmentTotalgro

8、upcontributionineachround,ownpayoffineachround,andownpayoffsthusfarinexperimentCommunicationPeriod“Aconsiderableamountoftheirdiscussiontimewaswastedinawkwardsilence.”“Inmanycases,s

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