交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]

交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]

ID:9898990

大小:50.50 KB

页数:12页

时间:2018-05-14

交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]_第1页
交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]_第2页
交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]_第3页
交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]_第4页
交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]_第5页
资源描述:

《交错董事会,管理防御和股利政策[外文翻译]》由会员上传分享,免费在线阅读,更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库

1、本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文:StaggeredBoards,ManagerialEntrenchment,andDividendPolicy2Background,literaturereview,andhypothesisdevelopment2.1TheroleofstaggeredboardsinentrenchingincumbentsIntheU.S.,boardsofdirectorscanbeeitherunitaryorstaggered.Infirmswithaunitaryboard,alldirectorsstandforelectione

2、achyear.Infirmswithastaggeredorclassifiedboard,directorsaredividedintothreeclasses,withoneclassofdirectorsstandingforelectionateachannualmeetingofshareholders.Ordinarily,aclassifiedboardhasthreeclassesofdirectors,whichinmoststatesofincorporationisthemaximumnumberofclassesallowedbystatec

3、orporatelaw(BebchukandCohen2005).Boardscanberemovedinoneofthefollowingtwoways.First,areplacementcanoccurduetoastand-aloneproxyfightbroughtaboutbyarivalteamthatattemptstoreplacetheincumbentsbutcontinuestorunthefirmasastand-aloneentity.Second,aboardmaybereplacedasaconsequenceofahostiletak

4、eover.Eitherway,thedifficultywithwhichdirectorscanberemovedcriticallydependsonwhetherthefirmhasastaggeredboard.Inastand-aloneproxycontest,staggeredboardsmakeitconsiderablymoredifficulttowincontrolbyrequiringarivalteamtoprevailintwoelections.Inahostiletakeover,staggeredboardsprotectincum

5、bentsfromremovalduetotheinteractionbetweenincumbentsandaboard’spowertoadoptandmaintainapoisonpill3.Beforetheadoptionofthepoisonpilldefense,staggeredboardsweredeemedonlyamilddefensemechanism,astheydidnotimpedetheacquisitionofacontrolblock.Theacceptanceofthepoisonpill,however,hasimmensely

6、strengthenedtheanti-takeoverpowerofstaggeredboards.TwopowerfulrecentstudiesbyBebchukandCohen(2005)andFaleye(2007)demonstratethatfirmswithstaggeredboard’sexhibitsignificantlylowervaluethanthosewithunitaryboards.Thus,theevidenceisinaccordancewiththenotionthatstaggeredboardspromotemanageri

7、alentrenchment,exacerbateagencyconflicts,andultimatelyhurtfirmvalue.2.2PriorliteratureExistingliteratureprovidesevidenceconsistentwiththeagencyroleofdividendsinAlleviatingJensen’s(1986)freecashflowproblem(Easterbrook1984;LangandLitzenberger1989;SmithandWatts1992;GaverandGaver19

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。