资源描述：
《does proximity matter in the choice of partners in collaborative r&d projects》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在工程资料-天天文库。
1、TCERWorkingPaperSeriesCentralization,DecentralizationandIncentiveProblemsinEurozoneFinancialGovernance:AContractTheoryAnalysisYutakaSuzukiFebruary2014WorkingPaperE-72http://tcer.or.jp/wp/pdf/e72.pdfTOKYOCENTERFORECONOMICRESEARCH1-7-10-703Iidabashi,Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo102-0072,Japan©2014byYutakaSu
2、zuki.Allrightsreserved.Shortsectionsoftext,nottoexceedtwoparagraphs,maybequotedwithoutexplicitpermissionprovidedthatfullcredit,including©notice,isgiventothesource.AbstractWeuseaContractTheoryframeworktoanalyzethemechanismsofEurozoneFinancialGovernance,withafocusoncentralizationvs.decentraliza
3、tionandincentiveproblems.ByconstructingaStackelberggamemodelwithnMinistriesofFinanceasthefirstmovers,andEuropeanCentralBankasthesecondmover,weshowthateachgovernmentcancreategrowthinitsowncountry(self-benefit)byincreasinggovernmentspending,butitwillincreaseinflationandtheeurovaluewillfall.Sinc
4、etheseeffectsaresharedequallybyeurocountries(costsharing),thereexistsanincentivetofree-rideonothercountries.Wethenanalyzeasolutiontothefree-riderproblemthroughthepenaltyscheme,andderiveasecondbestsolutionwhereacommitmentnottorenegotiatepenaltiesex-postisimpossible.Lastly,wederivetheparameterc
5、onditionsforoptimizingtheEU’scurrentallocationofauthority,“dividedauthoritystructure,”whichconsistsofMonetaryCentralizationandFiscalDecentralization.Wefindthatwhatiseffectiveis“contingencydependentgovernance”basedon“relativesovereignty,”wherethereisadivisionofauthorityasthebasicstructureandth
6、emainbodygovernswithleadingsovereigntydependingonthecontingency.YutakaSuzukiTCERandHoseiUniversityFacultyofEconomics4342AiharaMachidaTokyo194-0298Japanyutaka@hosei.ac.jpCentralization,DecentralizationandIncentiveProblems◆inEurozoneFinancialGovernance:AContractTheoryAnalysisYutakaSuzukiHoseiUn
7、iversityThisVersion,October11,2013AbstractWeuseaContractTheoryframeworktoanalyzethemechanismsofEurozoneFinancialGovernance,withafocusoncentralizationvs.decentralizationandincentiveproblems.ByconstructingaStackelberggamemodelwithnMinistriesofF
