国企高管超额薪酬与薪酬操纵分析——基于管理层权力理论的实证分析

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1、·AbstractAsthebackboneofChineseeconomydevelopment,themanagementlevelofstate-ownedenterprisesdeterminesitseffectiveoperationtoalargeextent.Topexecutivesmaymanipulatetheperformanceoftheenterprisebyconductingearningstoobtainhighersalary,whichwoulddamagethestockholders'equityseriouslyandhas

2、beenfocusedbyresearcherswidely.Topexecutivecompensationofmonopolyindustriesandnon-monopolyindustrieshasbeenabigtopicinrecentyears.Principal-agenttheorybelievesthatbymakingthemostoptimalcompensationcontractscaneffectivelymotivateexecutivestoworeforthegoalofmaximizingtheshareholders’wealt

3、h.However,thephenomenonofexecutivecompensationanomalieshasquestionedtheoptimalcontracttheoryinrecentyears.Thetheoryofmanagementpowerpartlyexplainswhytheoptimalcontractbetweenenterprisesandexecutiveisnotoptimal.HowdosethemanagementpowertheoryexplaintheexecutivecompensationofChina'sstate-

4、ownedenterprises?howdoseanexecutiveusetheirpowertoinfluencetheirownpayofChina'sstate-ownedenterprises?Throughwhatwaycanreducetheirrationalityofexecutivepay?Thestudyoftheabovequestionshasimportantsignificancefortheconsummatingofourcountrystate-ownedenterprise'sexecutivecompensationandpro

5、tectinginvestorrights.Thispapercollectedthedataoflistedstate-ownedenterprisesfrom2006to2012,tookthelistedstate-ownedcompaniesinourcountryastheoriginalsampleandcomparedthewholesample,monopolyindustryandperfectcompetitionindustry.Bystudyingwethertheexecutives’powercouldmanipulatehispayand

6、whattheirpreferencesandmethodare,thispaperdrawthefollowingconclusions:①thetopexecutivesofstate-ownedenterprisesinourcountrycangetextrapaybypoweronthewhole,andthebiggertheirpoweris,thegreatertheycangain.②Differenttypesofstate-ownedenterpriseshavedifferentpreferencesforexcessreturns.Monop

7、olyindustryexecutivesprefertogetexcessConcealedon-jobconsumptionasalternativechoiceofmonetarycompensation.Executivesofotherindustryprefertogetmonetarycompensation.③Completelycompetitiveenterprisedidnotusetheirpowertomanipulatecompensation,butthesensitivitybetweenpayandperforman