IR theory and EU foreign policy

《IR theory and EU foreign policy》由会员上传分享，免费在线阅读，更多相关内容在学术论文-天天文库。

ReviewArticleInternatIonalrelatIonstheoryandtherIseofeuropeanforeIgnandsecurItypolIcyByulrIchKrotzandrIchardMaher*Jeffreyt.checkel,ed.2007.InternationalInstitutionsandSocializationinEurope.newyork:cambridgeuniversitypress,292pp.Marisecremona,ed.2008.DevelopmentsinEUExternalRelationsLaw.oxford:oxforduniversitypress,336pp.MarisecremonaandBrunodeWitte,eds.2008.EUForeignRelationsLaw:Con-stitutionalFundamentals.portland,ore.:hartpublishing,324pp.sethg.Jones.2007.TheRiseofEuropeanSecurityCooperation.newyork:cam-bridgeuniversitypress,310pp.christopho.Meyer.2007.TheQuestforaEuropeanStrategicCulture:ChangingNormsonSecurityandDefenceintheEuropeanUnion.Basingstoke:palgraveMacmillan,232pp.Michaele.smith.2004.Europe’sForeignandSecurityPolicy:TheInstitutionaliza-tionofCooperation.newyork:cambridgeuniversitypress,308pp.tleastsincethemid-1960s,conventionalwisdomheldthateu-aropeanintegrationinforeignpolicy,security,anddefensewasun-likelytoamounttomuchveryquicklyorsmoothly,irrespectiveoftheoftenimpressiveachievementsinotherpolicyareas.1however,begin-ninginthemid-1990s,undertheauspicesofacommonforeignandse-curitypolicy(cfsp)andaeuropeansecurityanddefensepolicy(esdp),europeanintegrationinthesedomainsoftraditional“highpolitics”hasevolvedandconsolidatedbitbybit.theoldconventionalwisdom,thatis,nolongerseemstoaccuratelyreflectpoliticalreality.*WearegratefultotheeditorsofWorldPoliticsandtotheanonymousreviewersforhelpfulcom-mentsandsuggestions.1gordon1997–98;haas1975;hoffmann1966;hoffmann1982;hoffmann2000;zielonka1998.aninterestingearlyexceptionisgaltung1973.WorldPolitics63,no.3(July2011),548–79copyright©2011trusteesofprincetonuniversitydoi:10.1017/s0043887111000141 irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy549accordingly,agroupofscholarsofverydiversetheoretical,intellec-tual,anddisciplinarybackgroundshasarguedthateuropeanintegra-tioninthesepolicyareashasgainedconsiderablesubstance.amongotherdevelopments,thesescholarshaveidentifiednumeroussignsofthechangingclimate:—agrowingdesireineuropeforanincreasedabilitytoactautono-mouslyinsecurityanddefensemattersandtoraiseeurope’sprofileinworldpolitics;—theinstitutionalizationofpatternsandhabitsofcooperation,con-sensusbuilding,andconsultationinforeignandsecuritypolicy;—thecreationofeuropeanmilitaryforcesandsecurityinstitutions;—andtheemergenceofnormsandotherintersubjectiveunderstand-ings,includingtheconvergenceofnational“strategiccultures”aroundacommoneuropeanstrategicculture.Indeed,agrowingnumberofscholarsclaimthateuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy,likeeurope’spowerandinfluencemorebroadly,isontherise,andtheyaredocumentingtheirclaimswithmountingempiri-calevidence.onelongtimeobserverofeuropeanpoliticsholdsthateuropetodayisasuperpowerandthatworldpoliticsisonceagainbipolar,withtheunitedstatesandtheeuasthepoles.2generally,nationalgovernmentsremaininfirmcontrolofthecre-ationandimplementationofforeign,security,anddefensepolicy,suchthatdivergenceanddisagreementbetweengovernmentswillattimesbeinevitable.thisraisesaninterestingandimportanttheoreticalques-tion:whyisitthateuropeancooperationinforeign,security,andde-fensepolicy,whichhassignificantlyexpandedandconsolidatedoverthecourseofthepastfifteenyears,seemstoworkandholdtogetherinsomespecificinstancesyetnotinothers?aseventhemostcasualob-serverofeuropeanpoliticsknows,cooperationisunevenacrossbothcountriesandindividualpolicyissues.someeuropeancountries,suchasfrance,tendtostronglysupporteuropebecomingamorecohesiveandpowerfulactor,whereasothers,suchasBritain,tendtobemoreambivalent.Insomeinstances,suchaspeacekeeping,europeactsasvirtuallyasinglepoliticalactor,whereasinothers,suchastheuseofmilitaryforce,thefissuresanddisagreementsbetweengovernmentsof-tensurfacequicklyandremainpronounced.aclusterofrecentbooksandjournalarticlesshedstheoreticalandempiricallightonhalfofthisquestion,namely,whyintra-europeanforeignandsecuritypolicycooperationhasbecomemoresuccessfulin2Moravcsik2009;Moravcsik2010a;Moravcsik2010b. 550worldpoliticsrecentyearscomparedtowhatitwasinthepast.thesepublicationsplacedifferentemphasesonwhathaschangedandholdsharplydiffer-ingviewsonwhathascausedthechanges.thereisdivergenceoverjustwhatconstitutescooperation,howtomeasureit,andhowtoexplainitsvariationacrosstime.Whileeachauthorseekstodeveloptheoreticallyandconceptuallywellgroundedexplanationsfortheincreaseinthescopeandintensityofcooperation,eachdoessofrompositionsthatspannearlytheentirerangeofthemajorapproachestointernationalrelationstheoryandofscholarshiponworldpoliticsmorebroadly:re-alism,varioustypesofinstitutionalismandlegalinstitutionalization,andsocialconstructivism.theserecentwritingsbringtogetherinsig-nificantandilluminatingnewwaysthemainstrandsofirandsocialsciencetheorywiththehistoryandpoliticsofeuropeanintegration.Moreover,thistakesplaceinthepolicyareasinwhicheuropeanin-tegrationhadtraditionallybeentheweakestandleastdevelopedand,correspondingly,whichhadreceivedtheleasttheoreticalattention.takingthesebooksandarticlestogether,onecanidentifythreebroadissuesthatservetoframethisemergingfieldofstudy.consideredto-gether,theseworksilluminatetherangeofcausalforcesthatmayleadtoincreasedcooperationandthatshapeitsuniquecharacteristics,thepoliticalmotivationsbehindcooperation,andtheprospectsforcon-tinuedorevengreatercooperationinthefuture.first,howcanweuseirtheorytoexplainincreasedcooperationineuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy?Inwhatwayscanrealistvariablessuchasinternationalorregionaldistributionsofpoweraccountforgreatercooperation?oriscooperationafunctionofdecadesofinstitutionalizingcertainnormsandpatternsofbehaviororoftheincreasinglegalizationofeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy?ordoesitderivefromthegradualconver-genceofnationalstrategicculturesaroundadistincteuropeanstrate-gicculture?second,withwhatpurposedoeuropeanstatesadoptcommonposi-tionsinforeignandsecuritypolicy?throughacarefulreviewofthiscollectionofscholarlyworks,oneseeshowthevariousauthorsdefine,thoughsometimesonlyimplicitly,themanydifferentsocialandpoliti-calpurposesbehindthegreatereuropeancooperationinforeign,secu-rity,anddefensepolicy.realistsofdifferentstripespointtothedesireofmanyeuropeanstoactautonomouslyfromtheunitedstates;toavoidapotentialsecuritydilemmainpost–coldwareuropebybindinggermanyintoeuropeanpoliticalandsecurityinstitutions;ortobal-anceagainsttheunitedstatesinsomeform.historicalinstitutional-istsandscholarsfocusedontheexpansionanddeepeninglegalinstitu- irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy551tionalizationciteadesiretomakeforeignandsecuritypolicymorerulegovernedornotetheeffectsofpathdependenceforlockingincertainnormsandpracticesoveraspanofseveraldecades.constructivistsandsociologicalinstitutionalistspointtotheprocessofmovingbeyondthenation-stateasthemainsourceorproviderofsecurityandtothedeci-siveimportanceofnorms,ideas,socialization,anddiscourseforactors’strategies,policies,andconcreteinterests.3thethirdissueconcerns,inthevernacularofeuropeanintegration,theeu’s“finality.”Whereiseuropeanintegrationinforeignpolicy,security,anddefenseultimatelyheaded?towardafullyintegratedsys-teminwhichforeignandsecuritypolicyisdefinedandimplementedinBrussels?towardasysteminwhichthenationalgovernmentsretaintheirownprerogativesoverforeignandsecuritypolicybutincreasinglyconvergearoundcommonpositions,fromconflictpreventionandcrisismanagementintheBalkanstothepromotionofgoodgovernanceandhumanrightsinplacesasdisparateasthecaucasus,theBalkans,andsub-saharanafrica?ortoadecentralizedsysteminwhichpowerandauthorityflowupwardtosupranationalbodiesandsidewaystoprivateactors?absentanyconsensusonthefinalityissueamongscholarsorpol-icymakers,thescopeandintensityofcooperationmayofnecessityreachitsfunctionalandpoliticallimits,atleastintheforeseeablefuture.nonetheless,togetherandindividuallythebooksandarticlesun-derconsiderationherepromptarethinkingofalong-heldassump-tionabouteuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy:thatimpedimentstocooperationareinsurmountableandthatcooperationinforeignandsecuritypolicywillthusbeshallowandadhoc.theseworksagreethateuropeanforeignpolicyandsecuritycooperationhavereachedascopeandintensityunprecedentedinthehistoryofeuropeanintegration.ataminimum,thestartingpointinthefuturewillnotbedebatesovertheexistenceornonexistenceofsubstantivelevelsofcooperationbutratherwillbedebatesover(1)when,underwhatconditions,andtowhatex-tenteuropeanstatescooperatewitheachotherinforeignpolicyandsecuritymatters;(2)therelativeimportanceofdifferentcausalfactors,includingthestructuresoftheinternationalorregionalsystems,in-stitutions,andnorms,culture,andotherideationalvariables;and(3)theconsequencesforeuropeanpolitics,europeanstates,andworldpoliticsmorebroadly.3Inaddition,policymakerscitetheneedtoreducethedominanceoftheunitedstatesorfunctionalnecessities:torespondeffectivelytothemanypotentialdisruptionsoneurope’speriphery,europeangovernmentsneedtoactcollectively,ratherthanindividually.seecooper2004;Védrine2001. 552worldpoliticsatthesametime,onerealizesthat,aseuropeattemptstofinditsplaceintheworld,constraintsandimpedimentstogreatercoopera-tion—andthusperhapstoagreaterroleinworldpolitics—havehardlyvanished.Whenitcomestocoresecurityinterests,europeangovern-mentscontinuetopursuepredominantlynationallydefinedinterestsandpolicies.theheateddebatesprecedingtheanglo-americaninva-sionofIraqinMarch2003oreumemberstates’relationswithrus-sia,particularlyoverenergysecurity,illustratetheresilienceofstate-centeredinterests,power,andprerogatives.4Itisquestionsofvitalnationalinterestsandissuesregardingthepurposeof(pan-)europe’sincreasinglyoutwardorientationinforeignandsecuritypolicyandthedirectioninwhicheuropeisheadingthatwillcontinuetoaccountfortheunevenpatternsofcooperationandimposelimitsonthescopeandintensityofcooperationinthefuture.Innootherareaisthelikelihoodofincompatibilityofbasicinterestsandvalueshigherthaninforeignpolicy,security,anddefensebecausethosearetheissuesthatstrikeattheverycoreofstatesovereigntyandstateidentity.thisarticleisorganizedasfollows.thefirstsectionexaminessomedefinitionalissuesandsketcheshow,overthepastdecade,anewfieldhasemergedthatmergesthestudyofeuropeanforeign,security,anddefensepolicywithgeneraltheorizingininternationalrelations.thenextthreesectionsconsidereuropeancooperationinforeignandse-curitypolicyasseenthroughthelensesofsomeofthemaintheoreticalandconceptualapproachestoirtheorytoday:realism,varioustypesofinstitutionalism,andsocialconstructivism.thefifthsectiondrawsanumberoflessonsandinsightsfromreadingthesevariousbooksandarticlestogether.Inlightofthisarticle’sfindingsandarguments,theconcludingsectionreviewsthesubjectmatter’stheoreticalpromise,aswellasitspoliticalimportance.theemergenceofanewfieldofstudydespitetheadventofeuropeanforeign,security,anddefenseaffairsasadistinctareaofstudy,nostandarddefinitionofforeign,security,ordefensepolicycooperationhasemergedamongthegrowingnumberofscholarswhostudyit.thereis,inotherwords,noconsensusontheexactexplanandumorappropriatedependentvariable.thisisso4onIraq,seegordonandshapiro2004,128–36;onenergypolicy,seeabdelal2010;Buchan2009,esp.chap.9;Maher2011,chap.6.additionally,onrespondingtogenocide,notesmith2010.forageneraldiscussionofthefactorsandforcespromotingandunderminingeurope’semergenceasafullactorinforeignpolicy,security,anddefense,seeKrotz2009. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy553inpartbecausethevariousscholarsworkinginthefieldoperatefromverydifferenttheoreticalorientationsandareinterestedinexplainingdifferentaspectsofcooperation.Whilethismayprovideforafruitfuldiversityoftheoreticalandempiricalstudiesthatfocusondifferentfeaturesofeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy,italsotendstohindertheaccumulationofknowledgeonthesubjectmatter.amongthebooksunderreview,forexample,Jonesbreaksdownhisdependentvariable—securitycooperation—intofourcategories:securityinstitutions,economicsanctions,armsproduction,andmili-taryforces.smithparseshisdependentvariable—foreignandsecuritypolicycooperation—intotwodifferentcategories:quantitativeindica-torsofcooperationandqualitativeones.thequantitativeindicatorsincludetheexpansionofeuropeanpoliticalcooperation(epc)actionsandcfspcommonpositionsandjointactionsfrom1970to1995,thenumberoffunctionalissueswithwhicheuforeignpolicyhasdealt,andtheexpansionoftheeurepertoireofforeignpolicytoolsandin-struments.thequalitativeindicatorsincludetherationalefortheex-pansionofeuforeignpolicycooperationandthecollectiveresponsesofeumemberstates.Meyer’sexplanandumisthedegreeofnorma-tiveconvergencearoundadistinctandcoherenteuropean“strategicculture.”thecremonaandcremonaanddeWittevolumesdocu-menttheincreasinglegalizationofeuforeignpolicy,inparticular,thegrowthandcomplexityofeuexternalrelationslawandtheextenttowhichgovernmentsareaccountabletojudicialoversightoftheirfor-eignpolicyactions.theextentofthisdiversityisnotsurprising.foreignpolicy,security,anddefenseareexpansiveconceptsthatspanmultiplesetsofactionsandpractices.theycanincludeforeignaidandhumanitarianconcerns,areasinwhichboththeeuropeancommissionandtheindividualna-tionalgovernmentshavelongbeenactive.theeuhasconductedanumberofpeacekeepingmissions,bothwithinandoutsideofeurope.foreignandsecuritypolicyalsoincludesthecreationandimplemen-tationofmeasuresofcoercion,intimidation,anddeterrence—whatthomasschellingcalledthe“diplomacyofviolence.”5thisincludestheimpositionofsanctionsandembargoes,anareainwhicheuropeancountriesareincreasinglyworkingthroughtheeu.6forexample,theeu(aswellasindividualgovernments)hasimposedsanctionsonIranforitsfailuretoabidebysuccessivesecuritycouncilresolutionsto5schelling1966.6Jones2007,chap.4. 554worldpoliticshaltitsuraniumenrichmentprogram.defensepolicy,traditionallyanexclusivelynationalconcernandhistoricallytheleastintegratedpol-icyarea,isgenerallyunderstoodtoencompassdecisionsregardingthethreatoruseofforceaswellasarmsdevelopmentandproduction.7de-fensecooperationcouldincludehumanitarianinterventions,forwhichMeyerclaimsthereisincreasingsupportacrosseurope,althoughthissupportisunevenacrosscountries(pp.139–43).theveryexpansive-nessoftheseconceptsunderscoresthemultiplicityandmagnitudeoftheeuropeandevelopmentsatthesametimeasittendstoobscurewhatpreciselyismeantbycooperationorintegrationinforeignpolicy,security,anddefense,howtomeasureit,andhowtoevaluateitschangeovertime.ratherthanbeingdichotomous—absentorpresent—europeanco-operationinforeignandsecuritypolicyhasalwaysexistedalongacon-tinuum,bothbeforeandafterWorldWarII.thenineteenth-centuryconcertofeuropeisonetypeofregionalsecuritycooperation,aswasepcofthe1970sand1980s.8Moreprosaically,europe’sverypoliticalandinstitutionaldevelopmentsincetheendofWorldWarIIisaformofintenseforeignpolicycooperation.thusviewed,cooperationamongeuropeanstatesinforeignpolicy,security,anddefenseisnotanewphenomenon.Whatisnew,however,isthatforthefirsttimeeuropeappearstobeanincreasinglycohesivepoliticalunitthatislookingout-ward,beyondeurope.andthescopeandintensityofcooperationisqualitativelydifferenttodayascomparedwithwhatitwasevenintheveryrecentpast.furthermore,europeansecuritytodayembodiesgreatercomplexitythanitdidinthepast.notonlyistheregreatercooperationamongnationalgovernmentsbuttherearealsoamultitudeofdifferentac-torsthatmustbetakenintoaccount.theuseof“european”foreignandsecuritypolicycanthusbeambiguous,referringeithertosuprana-tionalortointergovernmentalprocesses.theeuropeancommissiondispenseshumanitarianaidandnegotiatestradeagreementsonbehalfofallmemberstates.9Intergovernmentalcooperationmayencompassalleumemberstatesorasubsetofeumemberstatesactingapartfromtherest.orindividualeuropeangovernmentsmayactunilater-ally.attimesa“commonposition”amongthetwenty-sevenmember7oninterstatecooperationanditsimpedimentsinsecurityanddefense,aswellasneglectedas-pectsofregionalintegrationineuropeintheseareasfromthe1970sthroughthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury,seeKrotz2011.8onthecongressofViennaandconcertofeurope,seeschroeder1994,chaps.12,13;onepc,seenuttall1992.9ontrade,noteMeunier2007. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy555statesemergesonspecificissues.atothertimesdifferentgroupsofstatestakethelead,forexample,theBritish-french-german“troika”innegotiationswithIran.Individualstatescontinuetopursuespe-cialrelationshipswithcountrieswithinoroutsideofeurope,suchasfrance-germanyorBritainwiththeunitedstates.Inpractice,euro-peangovernmentsoscillatebetweendifferentdegreesofunilateralism,bilateralism,andmultilateralisminpursuitofnationalor“european”valuesandinterests.theformationofWesteuropeansecurityarrangementsafterWorldWarIIwasdeeplyintertwinedwiththebeginningofthecoldwar,u.s.involvementincontinentalreconstruction,andearlystepstowardeuropeanintegration.10theeuropeandefensecommunity(edc)wastoparallelthe1951europeancoalandsteelcommunity(ecsc)inbindingeuropeangovernmentsandsocietiesmorecloselytogether.theedcwouldhaveestablishedaeuropeofthe“originalsix”—Westgermany,france,Italy,andtheBeneluxcountries—effectivelyinte-gratedinsecurityanddefense,anditwouldhavecreatedaeuropeanmilitary.theedc’sconclusivefailurein1954broughtabouttwolon-ger-termconsequences:natoandthetrans-atlanticframedecisivelytookoverintheareasofsecurityanddefense,andultimateauthorityinthedomainsoftraditionalhighpoliticsremainedatthelevelofthenation-state.thus,formanydecades,politicalrealitiesprovidedlittlereasonforscholarstospendmuchtimethinkingabouteuropeaninte-grationanditscausalforcesinthesepolicydomains.fromtheinitialpostwardevelopmentofeuropeanintegrationinthe1950s,foreignandsecuritypolicyreceivedlittleempiricalandevenlesstheoreticalattention.startinginthe1990s,however,followingeurope’sfailuretostemtheviolenceintheBalkans,theeuhasbecomemoreseriousaboutmatchingitssignificantcommercialandeconomicprowesswithdip-lomaticandpoliticalinfluence.Indecember2003theeureleaseditsveryfirstpaperoutliningauniquesecuritystrategy,“asecureeuropeinaBetterWorld,”andithasarticulatedanumberofareasinwhichitseekstoactasasingle,unifiedactor.11thetimewhenforeignanddefensepolicyisdictatedfromBrusselsforallmemberstatesisstillfaroff—ifnotcompletelyunrealistic.however,evenifstatescontinueto10hillandsmith2000;Katzenstein2005;lundestad1998;lundestad2003;trachtenberg1999.11europeancommission2003.subsequently,areflectiongroup’sMay2010reportanalyzedsomeofthelonger-term(thatis,2020–30)challengesfacingtheeuinworldpoliticsandinternationalsecurity.seeeuropeancouncil2010. 556worldpoliticsdefinethebasicparameters,foreignanddefensepolicyineuropeisnolongerexclusivelyamatterofatomizednation-states.12evenBritain,longambivalentoverthecreationofaeuropeanse-curityanddefenseposture,reversedcourseindecember1998atst.Malo,whenprimeMinistertonyBlairpledged,alongwithpresidentJacqueschiracoffrance,Britain’sreadinesstoseetheeubecomeapoliticalactorbackedbymilitarycapability.13lessthanfiveyearslater,inMarch2003,eutroopstookoverfornatoinBosniaandMacedo-nia,markingtheeu’sfirstmilitarymission.InJuneofthatsameyeareuropeantroopsembarkedonamissiontoeasterncongo,theeu’sfirstmilitarymissionoutsideofeurope.theclassictheoreticalpositionsoneuropeanintegration—neo-functionalism,asarticulatedbyernsthaas,andintergovernmental-ism,asinitiallyformulatedbystanleyhoffmann—agreedthattheintegrativepressuresthatcharacterizedotherpolicydomainswouldbeextremelydifficultifnotimpossibletoreplicateinthesecurityanddefenserealms.14theothermaintheoreticaloranalyticalframeworksusedtostudyeuropeanintegrationandeuropeanpolitics—transac-tionism,federalism,andmultilevelgovernance—neverproducedmajortheoreticalstatementsoneuforeignandsecurityaffairs.15untilal-mosttheendofthetwentiethcentury,theorizingoneuropeaninte-grationremainedfairlyalooffromthemaindevelopmentsingeneralirtheory.overthecourseofthe1990s,andrewMoravcsikwasamongthefirstandmostimportantscholarstoseekdirectconnectionsbetweenthestudyofeuropeanintegrationandgeneralirtheory,formulatinga“liberalintergovernmentalist”approachthatcombinedhoffmann’soriginalstatismwithaliberaloutlookthatrootednationalinterests(or“statepreferences”)indomesticandtransnationalsocieties.16In-stitutionalist,socialconstructivist,andstructuralrealistexplanationsofeuropeanintegrationfollowed.17thebooksandarticlesconsidered12foroverviewsofthedevelopmentandexpansionofeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicyfromvariousangles,seeWallace2005;KeukeleireandMacnaughtan2008;smith2008;Bindi2010;chiv-vis2010;Mérand,foucault,andIrondelle2011.13howorth2000.14haas1958;haas1975;hoffmann1966;hoffmann1982.15onKarldeutsch’spioneeringworkontransactionismandcybernetics,seedeutsch1954;deutschetal.1957;deutsch1963;indeutsch’sspirit,notepuchala1970;Katzenstein1976;sand-holtzandstonesweet1998.onfederalistapproaches,seeetzioni1965;spinelli1972;etzioni2001.onmultilevelgovernance,seehoogheandMarks2001;Jachtenfuchs2001;laratandKohler-Koch2009.16Moravcsik1991;Moravcsik1993;Moravcsik1997;Moravcsik1998.17pierson1996;cowles,caporaso,andrisse2001;fligstein,sandholtz,andstonesweet2001;parsons2003;rosato2010. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy557herecontinueandexpandthistrendinapplyinggeneralirandsocialsciencetheorytoeuropeanpolitics—thistimetoforeign,security,anddefensepolicy.Whathasemergedisanincreasinglydistinctfieldofstudywithitsownresearchquestions,conceptualissues,andsearchforcausalexpla-nations.irtheoryisnowfullyengagingwitheuropeanintegrationstudiesandviceversa—and,paradoxically,inpreciselythosepolicyar-easinwhicheuropeanintegrationtraditionallyhadbeentheweakestandleastdeveloped.realism:Bindinggermany,autonomyfromtheunitedstates,Balancingtheincreaseineuropeansecuritycooperationinthepost–coldwarera,aswellaseuropeanintegrationingeneral,posedapuzzleforstructuralrealisttheory.18WiththecollapseofthesovietunionandtheWarsawpact,europeanstatesnolongerfacedathreattotheirpoliticalandterritorialintegrity.accordingly,manyrealistsexpectedeuropeanin-tegration,alongwithnato,toweakenorrecede;someevenanticipatedpowercompetitiontoreturntotheeuropeancontinent.19however,ratherthanrevertingtoabalanceofpowersystemreminiscentofthenineteenthcentury,europeansecurityhasbecomemoredeeplyinstitu-tionalized.Insteadofviewingeachotheraspotentialcompetitorsandsourcesofthreat,europeanstateshaveincreasedthescopeandinten-sityoftheircooperation.Inresponsetothesedevelopments,realism—largelyabsentfromthefieldsincehoffmann’sclassic1966articleonthedurabilityofthenation-stateineurope20—hasonceagainenteredthetheoreticaldebateoneuropeanintegration.InTheRiseofEuropeanSecurityCooperation,Jonesaskswhy,aftersomanyfailedattemptsinthepast,europeanstateshavebeenbothmoreopentocooperationandmoresuccessfulinestablishingitinareassuchasthecreationofaeuropeansecurityinstitution(cfsp);theimpositionofeconomicsanctionsonaeuropeanratherthananationalortransat-lanticbasis;collaborationonarmsproduction;andthecreationofeu-ropeanmilitaryforces.Jonesattributestheincreaseinintra-europeansecuritycooperationtochangesinthestructureofboththeinterna-tionalsystemandtheregionalsystemineuropefollowingtheendofthecoldwar.Withthecollapseofthesovietunion,theinternational18collard-Wexler2006.19Mearsheimer1990;Waltz1993.20exceptionsincludegrieco1995;grieco1996. 558worldpoliticssystemshiftedfrombipolaritytounipolarity.twosubsequentdevel-opmentschangedthesecurityenvironmentineuropeandpotentiallythreateneditsstability.first,aunifiedgermanyemergedasapotentialregionalhegemon.then,intheearly1990s,theunitedstatesbegantorapidlyreduceitstrooppresenceonthecontinent,raisingconcernsaboutitslong-termcommitmenttoeuropeansecurity.Bothchangeswerepotentiallyhighlydestabilizingtothestrategicequilibriumineurope.Inparticular,somefearedthattheinevitablewithdrawaloftheunitedstatesfromthecontinentwouldcreateapowervacuumintheheartofeurope.thesesimultaneouschangestotheinternationalandregionaldis-tributionsofpower,accordingtoJones,motivatedeuropeanstatestocooperateonsecurityissuesfortwomainreasons.first,europeangovernments,includinggermany’s,wereanxioustomaintainpeaceandstabilityineurope.Withgermany’sriseinrelativepowerandtheunitedstates’eventualretreatfromeurope,apotentialsecuritydilemmaloomed.21europeangovernmentssoughttobindgermanyintoaeuropeansecurityinstitutiontopreventitfromfomentingin-stability.thiswassuccessfulbecausegermanytodayisastatusquoratherthanarevisionistpowerandbecausegermanpoliticalleadersalsorecognizedandwantedtoavoidasecuritydilemma.thesecondreasonwastoincreaseeurope’sabilitytoprojectpowerabroadandtodecreaseitsrelianceontheunitedstates.followingthecoldwar,itwasinevitablethateuropeandtheunitedstateswouldnolongerdefinetheirinterestswiththesamedegreeofcompatibilityastheyhadduringtheprecedingdecades.thewarsintheformeryu-goslaviainthe1990scharacterizedthisnewrealitymostprofoundly.europe,paralyzedbydivisionandincoherence,catastrophicallyfailedtostopthebloodshedintheBalkans.theunitedstates,havingnoimmediatesecurityinterestsintheregion,encouragedtheeuropeanstodothejobthemselves.onlyafterithadbecomeclearthatitwouldtakeamericanmilitaryactiontostopthekillingandthattheverycred-ibilityofnatowasatstakedidtheunitedstatesintervene.thewarsinBosniaandKosovoalsodemonstratedthevastdisparityinmilitarycapabilitiesbetweentheunitedstatesandeurope.followingthesewars,europeansrealizedtheyhadtodevelopanautonomousmilitarycapabilitytousewhenandwheretheunitedstateschosenottoact.americanunipolarity,accordingtoJones(pp.21–24etpassim),wasanecessaryconditionforenhancedeuropeansecuritycooperation.21onthe“securitydilemma”ininternationalpolitics,seeherz1950;Butterfield1951;Jervis1978;and,morerecently,glaser1997. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy559Whileinsistingthattheunitedstatesdoesnotposeanykindofthreattoeurope,Jonesholdsthatintra-europeansecuritycooperationwouldnothaveproceededasquicklyintheabsenceofamericanunipolarity.americanpreponderanceproducedadependenceonamericanmili-taryandpoliticalpowerforeuropeancountries.Itfollowedfromthissituationthataprimarymotivationbehindrecenteuropeansecuritycooperationwastoreduceeurope’srelianceontheunitedstatesandtoincreaseitsautonomyinworldpolitics.Jonesprovidesanarrayofevidencedemonstratingthatsignificantincreasesinintra-europeansecuritycooperationhaveinfactmaterial-izedincertainpolicyareassincethecoldwarperiod.afterthreefailedattemptsinthepast,theeuhasbeensuccessfulincreatingaeuro-peansecurityinstitution(cfsp).Whereasbetween1950and1990eu-ropeangovernmentsthatimposedeconomicsanctionsonanotherstatedidsothroughtheecinonlytwooutofseventeencases(12percent),since1991eumemberstateshaveimposedeconomicsanctionsontargetstatesthroughtheeuintwenty-oneoutoftwenty-sevencases(78percent)(p.97).europeanarmsproducersaremorelikelytoenterpartnershipswithoneanother,ratherthanwithamericanfirms.andtheeunowhasitsownmilitaryforcethatitcandeploytoareasofinstability.thebook,however,willnotsatisfyallskeptics,especiallythosewhobelievethateurope’simpressivecapabilities—economic,politi-cal,military,andculturalor“softpower”appeal—havenotyettrans-latedintorealinfluenceandfallfarshortofeurope’sattimesgrandambitions.22forexample,Jonesdoesnotexaminewhethereuropeansecuritycooperationleadstoeffectiveoutcomes.europemayhaveitsownsecurityinstitutions,andeuropeanstatesmaybeimposingsanc-tionsthroughtheeumuchmorethantheydidduringthecoldwar,butdosuchsanctionsbringresults?arethey,forexample,successfulinchangingthebehaviorofthetargetstate?andcaneuropesucceedinbundlingitscapabilitiesandactcoherentlywhenitreallymatters?onarguablythemostconsequentialsecuritydecisionsincetheendofthecoldwar—whichpositiontotakeregardingtheunitedstates’invasionofIraq—theeuropeanswerehopelesslydivided.Javiersolana,atthetimethehighrepresentativeforcfsp,wascompletelymarginalizedinthelead-uptotheinvasion.Whatdoesthissayabouttheeffectivenessofthisinstitutionandabouteurope’srealimpact?approachingthesubjectmatterthroughstructuralrealistprecepts,Jonesopenshimselftothefamiliarchargethatheleavesoutmorethan22this“capabilities-expectations”gapisanoldconcern.seehill1993. 560worldpoliticsheincludes.forexample,thereisnodiscussionofdomesticpolitics,theweightofeurope’shistoryoneliteandpublicattitudestosecuritypolicy,ortherecognitionoftheimportanceofpoliticalleadership,withacorrespondingcompletelackofagencyforeuropeanpolicymakers.thisissomewhatcuriousbecause,asstructuralrealistsconcede,theinternationalsystemsimplyshapesthesecurityenvironmentinwhichstatesoperate;structurealonedoesnotdetermineoutcomes.23Inreallife,however,weknowthatpoliticalleaders,theirmotivations,andtheirchoicesmattergreatly,forboththeformandthecontentofco-operation.Jonesneglectsmanyothertrendsineuropeanpolitics.forexample,hisaccountcannotexplainwhytherehasbeengreatersup-portamongfrenchandgermanpolicymakersforintra-europeanse-curitycooperation,whereasothereuropeanstatessuchasBritain,thenetherlands,poland,andseveralincentralandeasterneuropehavesoughtinsteadtomaintaintheprimacyofnato.anumberofotherrealistshavesettheirsightsoneuropeansecuritycooperationinrecentyears.24Whilecertainsimilaritiesabound—allplacecausalprimacyonthestructureoftheinternationalsystem—thereareinterestingdifferencesaswell,bothaboutthecausesofgreatercooperationandaboutthemotivationsbehindit.Barryposen,forex-ample,attributesincreasedintra-europeansecuritycooperationtotra-ditionalbalanceofpower(asopposedtobalanceofthreat)dynamics.25europeansecuritycooperation,inposen’saccount,isnotmotivatedbyfearofanimminentthreatfromtheunitedstates.Instead,europeangovernmentsareconcernedaboutmaintainingtheirautonomyandin-dependentcapabilities.Whiletheunitedstatesandeuropecontinuetosharemanyvaluesandcommoninterests,theydonotnecessarilyhavethesamestrategicobjectives.Bytakingadvantageofeconomiesofscale,europeensuresthatitwillbeabletoactindependentlyoftheunitedstatesinareassuchascrisismanagementandconflictprevention.realistsalsoholddifferentviewsonwhethereuropeisbalancingagainsttheunitedstatesand,ifso,whetherthisbalancingisofthe“hard”or“soft”type.stephenBrooksandWilliamWohlforthseenoevidenceofsuchbalancing.theyarguethatregionalsecuritycon-cerns,ratherthanbalancingambitions,motivatetheincreaseinintra-europeansecurityanddefensecooperation.26Keirlieberandgerard23Waltz1986,343–44;posen2006,160.24art2004;hyde-price2006;Kupchan2002;Kupchan2003;posen2006.25foracontraryview,seehoworthandMenon2009.theseminalworkonbalanceofthreatrealismisWalt1987.26BrooksandWohlforth2005;BrooksandWohlforth2008,80–83. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy561alexanderdonotvieweuropeansecurityanddefensecooperationasamountingtoverymuch—certainlynotenoughtobalanceu.s.pre-ponderance.27robertarttakesissuewithbothoftheseviews.hearguesthatthemotivebehindtheeu’sefforttoincreaseitssecurityanddefensecapabilitiesisclearlyacaseofbalancingtheunitedstates.28specifically,Britainandfrancelaunchedesdp“toenhancetheirpoliticalinfluencewithinthetransatlanticalliancethroughsoftbalancing,butnottochallengeamerica’smilitaryhegemonywithhardbalancing.”29onethingonwhichrealistsdoseemtoagreeisthateurope’sin-creasedsecurityanddefensecooperationwillservetocomplicaterela-tionsbetweentheunitedstatesandeuropeandleadtomorefrequenttransatlanticdisagreements.30aseuropechartsamoreindependentcourseinworldpoliticsandrelieslessontheunitedstatesforitsba-sicsecurityneeds,theunitedstatesandeuropewillnolongerdefinetheirinterestswiththesamedegreeofcommonalityastheydidduringthecoldwarandinitsimmediateaftermath.institutionalism:pathdependenceandlegalizationWithabookandanumberofarticlesoverthepastdecade,Michaelsmithhasemergedasthemostvisibleexpositorofalargelyhistori-calinstitutionalistapproachtoexplainingtheappearanceandconsoli-dationofeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicycooperation.31InEu-rope’sForeignandSecurityPolicy:TheInstitutionalizationofCooperation,smithaskshowec/eumemberstateshavebeenabletointensifytheircooperationinforeignandsecuritypolicysince1970whilesimul-taneouslyrespectingthesovereigntyoftheindividualmemberstatesandavoidingthetransferofcontroloverforeignandsecuritypolicytoBrussels.smith’sexplanation,however,actuallydrawsonvariousin-stitutionalistapproachesandcombineselementsofhistorical,socio-logical,andrationalisttheorizing.32ashesays:“euforeignpolicyma-turedfromaweakintergovernmentalforuminspiredbyinstrumental27lieberandalexander2005.28art2004;art2005–6.29art2004,199.30hyde-price2006,231–32;Jones2007,238–43;Kissinger2001,chap.2;posen2006,185.31Inadditiontothebook,seesmith2000;smith2001;smith2004a;smith2004b.foraforerun-nerofthisapproach,seeginsberg2001.32hallandtaylor1996;haftendorn,Keohane,andWallander1999;pierson2004;KatznelsonandWeingast2005;Krotz2010.oncombiningrationalistandconstructivistapproaches,seefearonandWendt2002.forahintofsociologicalinstitutionalisminsomeofsmith’swork,noteespecially2004a. 562worldpoliticsrationalityintoamoreinstitutionalizedpolicy-makingsystemgov-ernedbysocialrationality.”33accordingtosmith,europeanforeignpolicycooperationisnotdirectedbysupranationalinstitutions;doesnotinvolvebargainingbetweenthememberstatesover,forexample,sidepaymentsorissuelinkages(issue-specificlobbyingisvirtuallynonexistent,especiallycomparedwithotherpolicyareas);isnotdominatedbythelargeststates(therotatingsix-monthpresidencygivessmallstatesimportantagenda-settingandleadershipopportunities);anddoesnotreflectthelowestcommondenominator(assmithpointsout,preferenceoutli-ersoftenadapttheirpositionstobemoreinlinewiththecommunityposition).externalinfluences,notablyamericanpoweroramericanpolicychoices,alsocannotexplaincooperation.norcanfunctionalorpoliticalspillover(pp.25–32).34Instead,europeanforeignpolicyandsecuritycooperationemergedthroughtheinstitutionalizationofhabitsandpatternsofcooperation,consultation,andconsensusbuilding,andmuchofthebookisdevotedtoexaminingthishistoricalprocess.progresswasgradualandincre-mental,markedbybothintendedandunintendedconsequences,andhasexceededanythingplannedinthefirstmeetingofepcin1970.assmithfinds,“althougheuforeignpolicywasestablishedalongstrictintergovernmentallinesonthebasisofagrandbargain,ithasbecomefarmoreinstitutionalizedthanitsarchitectshadintendedorevenexpected.”35thisinstitutionalizationhasaffectednotonlyactors’interestsbuttheiridentitiesaswell,especiallythosewhoworkinthepermanentbureaucracyinBrussels.Institutionsleadtogreatercooperationinforeignandsecuritypol-icybytwomechanisms.thefirst,andmoreimportant,ispreemption.Bythissmithmeansthatinstitutionalizationkeepseuropeangov-ernmentsfromunilaterallyadoptingfixedpositionsonconsequentialforeignandsecuritypolicyissueswithoutconsultingothereuropeangovernments.36thesecondiselitesocialization.thishasfosteredatransitionfromactorspursuingtheirowninstrumentalrationality“basedonpredeterminednationalpositions”toa“sociallyconstructedrationalitybasedoncollectivepositions.”37historically,institutionalization,accordingtosmith,developedinthreestages(pp.40–49).thefirststagebeganwiththecreationofepc33smith2004a,103.34seealsosmith2004a,96–98.35smith2004a,99.36smith2004a,101.37smith2004a,101–2. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy563in1970.thiswasastrictlyintergovernmentalforum,bothinformalandinexpensive(inpoliticalandothercosts),thatsoughttocreateconsensusamongtheforeignministersofthedifferentecmemberstates.governmentsatfirstwerehighlyreluctanttocedeanycontrolorauthorityinforeignandsecuritypolicytosupranationalinstitutions.asaresult,therewaslittleexpectationthattheinitialmeetingsbe-tweenforeignministerswouldresultinanysubstantivedevelopments.thesecondstagefeaturedthedevelopmentofatransgovernmen-talepcnetwork.thenetworkincludedpolicyexperts,bureaucrats,andmembersoftheforeignpolicyestablishmentsoftheecmemberstates.themeetingsbecamemorefrequent,informationsharingwasenhanced,workinggroupswerecreated,andthetelexsystemofcom-municationwasdeveloped.assmithpointsout,duringthisphaseauniquecultureofcooperationemergedamongtheforeignministriesthatincludedsharedstandardsofbehavior,sharedunderstandings,andacommon(political)language.theforeignpolicyelitesindifferentgovernmentsgottoknowoneanotherandbecamecomfortablework-ingwitheachother.trustdeveloped,andconsultationbecamesecondnature(whathasbeencalleda“coordinationreflex”).thethirdstageinvolveddeepeningtheinstitutionalizationprocess,whichincludedtheemergenceofrulesandnorms,includingtheexpec-tationthateugovernmentswouldconsulteachotherbeforetakingapositiononanimportantissue,andthedevelopmentoftheacquispoli-tique.Withthe1992Maastrichttreaty,cfspbecameoneoftheeu’s“threepillars,”togetherwithmonetaryunionandJusticeandhomeaffairs.Withoutthetwentyyearsofepc,smithmaintains,cfspwouldhavebeendifficultifnotimpossibletoachieve.euforeignpolicyhasalsobecomeanincreasinglylegalizeddomain.legalizationisaparticularanddistinctiveformofinstitutionaliza-tion.Itinvolvesdecisionstoimposelegalconstraintsongovernmentsinparticularissueandpolicyareas.38legalizationcreatesobligationsongovernmentsandsubjectsbehaviortooutsidescrutinythroughthedelegationofmonitoringandrelatedtaskstothirdparties.InEUForeignRelationsLaw:ConstitutionalFundamentalsandDe-velopmentsinEUExternalRelationsLaw,legalscholarscremonaanddeWittedocumenttheexpandinglegalinstitutionalizationofeuro-peanforeignandsecurityaffairsandtherebycomplementandfleshoutotherinstitutionalworkonthesubject.thedeepeningoflegalnormsandprinciplesintheeu’sexternalrelationshastakenplaceviatwo38goldsteinetal.2001. 564worldpoliticspathways—throughtheexpansionoftheeu’sroleinexternalrela-tionsinthesingleeuropeanact(sea)andtheMaastrichttreaty;andthroughaprocessofjudicialreview:“wehaveseenarapidthickeningofjudge-madeconstitutionallawrelatingtotherespectiverolesofthecommission,thecouncil,andtheparliament,totheintricatedivisionofcompetencesbetweentheeuandMemberstates”(cremonaanddeWitte2008,xii).asaresultofthesetwodevelopments,“theeu’sforeignrelationshavegrownmassivelyinvolumeandcomplexity”(cremonaanddeWitte2008,xiii).thereisanincreasinglylargevolumeofbothtreatylawandcaselawonissuesrangingfromtradeanddevelopmentpolicy,theeu’sroleinneighborhoodconflicts(particularlycoveringconflictprevention),andtheeu’sneighborhoodpolicy,thatis,thepolitical,institutional,andconstitutionalchangesstatesmustmaketobecon-sideredforeumembership.atthesametime,evenasforeignandsecuritypolicyhasbecomemorelegalized,memberstateshaveresistedfulllegalizationinthesedomains,particularlyinareasofvitalnationalinterests.39thisseemstobetrueforinstitutionalizationingeneral.frequently,onehasthesensethatinstitutionalizationcanexplaincooperationonlyincasesinwhichvitalinterestsarenotatstake.decadesofinstitutionalizationdidnotpreventthefiascoessurroundingBosnia,Kosovo,andIraq,ortheself-helppoliciesinrelationswithrussia.this,manymightsay,maybesoberingnewsforinstitutionaltheorizingmoregenerally,astheeu,composedofadvancedWesterndemocracieswithalonghistoryofco-operation,shouldbeafavorabledomainforeffectiveinstitutionalizedsecuritycooperation.Whiletheliteratureoninstitutionalizationandlegalizationillu-minatesimportantdevelopmentsineuforeignandsecuritypolicy,questionspersistovertheirtruecausalrole.Inmanyinstances,institu-tionalizationistoacertainextentendogenoustootherfactors—suchaseconomicintegration,shiftsindomesticpreferences,theexpansionandconsolidationofdemocraticinstitutions,integrationinotherpolicyandissueareas,andnormativeevolution,atboththesocietalandtheelitelevels.evaluatingtherealimpactofinstitutionsindependentlyfromtheseotherfactorsthereforeremainsadauntingyetcriticaltask.finally,institutionalismcanbevagueontheinternaldynamicslead-ingtoinstitutionalchangeandevolution,especiallyonthemagnitudeandspeedofinstitutionalization.smithcitesthreesuchlogics:afunc-39smith2001. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy565tionallogic,normativeappropriateness,andasociocultural(orsocial-ization)logic(p.33).asahistoricalinstitutionalist,heholdsthatinsti-tutionsevolveincrementallyandgraduallyovertime.Inmanyinstances,however,institutionaldevelopmentdoesnotproceedinaconstantandgradualmanner.Insuchcases,theideaofpunctuatedequilibriummightbeabetteranalogytoexplaintheinstitutionalizationofeuro-peanforeignandsecuritypolicy.40punctuatedequilibriumpositslongperiodsofstasisinterruptedbyrelativelybriefperiodsofmajorchange.cfspwasdormantuntilfranceandgermanymadeadealatMaas-trichtonpoliticalandeconomicunion.similarly,defensecooperationremainedmodestuntilthe1998franco-Britishagreementinst.Malo.socialconstructivism:strategicculture,normativeconvergence,socializationscholarshaveadoptedconstructivistperspectivestoexplainvariousfeaturesofeuropeanpolitics,includingaspectsofregionalintegrationandeasternenlargement;europe’sregionalpolitywithinthe“ameri-canimperium”;socializationofdifferentsorts;andvariousaspectsofeuropeanidentity.41Butonlyrecentlyhavescholarsusedconstructiv-ismtoexplaineuropeansecuritycooperation.sofarthisnewfocushasmostlyevolvedaroundaskingwhetheracommoneuropean“strategicculture”isemergingorwhetherinfactitalreadyexistsinsomeformandwhatifanyeffectthishasonstatebehavior.researchontheemergenceandpossiblerobustnessofaeuropeanstrategiccultureispoliticallyimportant.anumberofscholars(andnotonlythosestudyingstrategicculture)andpolicypractitionershaveclaimedthateuropeanforeignpolicy,security,anddefense,iftheyaretogrowbeyondcurrentrolesandcapabilities,willrequireafoundationofsharedinterests,values,priorities,perceptionsofthreat,andlegiti-matemeansandendsfortheuseofmilitaryforce,aswellasagreementoneurope’sproperroleintheworld.Ifdisagreementordivergenceontheseissuespersists,manyacademicsandpolicymakersbelieve,thencooperationinthesepolicyareasisunlikelytodevelopandconsolidate.InTheQuestforaEuropeanStrategicCulture,Meyeranalyzestheextenttowhichnationalstrategicculturesineuropehaveconvergedsincetheendofthecoldwar.strategiccultures“comprisedeep-seatednorms,beliefs,andideasaboutastate’sroleintheworld,itsperception40Krasner1984;Krasner1988;eldredgeandgould1972.41Mcnamara1999;christiansen,Jørgensen,andWiener2001;parsons2003;schimmelfennig2003;Katzenstein2005;checkel2007;Krotz2007;checkelandKatzenstein2009;risse2010. 566worldpoliticsofsecuritythreats,andthelegitimatemeansandendsfortheuseofforce”(p.2).thoughtheseculturesremaindistinct,Meyerfindsthatthereisincreasingconvergenceamongeuropeanstatesregardingthedeprioritizationofterritorialdefensesincetheendofthecoldwar;theneedandlegitimacyofhumanitarianinterventionandpeacekeeping;astrongrolefortheun,includingauthorizingtheuseofmilitaryforce;andageneralpreferenceforcivilianratherthanmilitarypolicyinstru-ments(p.185).WhileMeyerclaimstherehasbeenbroadnormativeconvergenceamongBritain,france,germany,andpoland(thefourcountriesunderconsiderationinhisbook),hecautionsthatnationaldifferencesstillexist:“[n]ormativeconvergenceintheseareasdoesnotmeanthatnationalbeliefshavebecomefullycompatible,butonlythatdifferenceshavenarrowed”(p.11).Inexplainingtheprocessofnormativeconvergence,Meyerspecifiesthreecausalmechanisms:changingthreatperceptionsduetochangesintheexternalsecurityenvironment;institutionalsocializationandtheroleofepistemiccommunitiesasthedriversofcognitivechange;and“mediatized”crisislearning,bywhichhemeansnormativeshiftswithinmediadiscoursethatinturnchallengeexistingsocialnormsandinducelearning(p.6).toassessthedegreeofnormativeconvergence—andthustheextenttowhichadistinctlyeuropeanstrategiccultureisemerging—Meyerusesdatafrompublicopinionpolls,acontentanal-ysisofnewspapers,andresponsestoaquestionnairebythinktankex-pertsandbynationalparliamentarianssittingondefensecommittees.Whereiseuropeheading,andwhatisthepurposeofforeignpolicyandsecuritycooperation?Meyerseestheemergenceofwhathecalls“humanitarianpowereurope,”wherethereisconvergenceon“lowtomediumlevelofrisktoleranceregardingtheproportionateuseofforce,moderatetohighauthorizationrequirements[fortheuseofmilitaryforce],agrowingattachmenttotheeuasanactorwithageneralpreferenceforusingsoftpower,andsupportforgoalsregard-ingtheuseofforce,whichdonotsubstantiallytranscendbeyondthepurposesofhumanitarianism”(p.30).thisiscontrastedtotwootheridealtypes:“helvetianeurope,”whereeuropewouldlimititsglobalcommitmentsandprofile,leavemilitaryalliancessuchasnato,andprivilegenonalignmentandneutrality;and“globalpowereurope,”inwhicheuropewoulduseitsaggregatedpowertoadoptamoreactivistoutwardorientation,includingthepursuitofrealpolitik,ahighertoler-anceforrisk,andlowerthresholdsfortheauthorizationofforce.althoughMeyerasksimportantquestionsandexpandsthetheoret-icaldebate,theissuesofwhetherornotacommoneuropeanstrategic irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy567cultureisemergingandwhateffectthismighthaveonstatebehaviorultimatelyremaininconclusive.evenMeyerconfessesthatonlya“nar-row”and“thin”strategicculturehasemerged(p.42).Moreover,mea-suringtheexistenceandthecausaleffectofstrategicculture(ornor-mativeconvergence)—acrossfourcountriesreflectingculturalchangeswithinanentireregion—isaconceptuallyandmethodologicallychal-lengingtask.strategiccultureorrelatedtypesofdomesticconstructionhavecommonlybeenusedtoexplainorcomparetheconductofsinglecountries.42conceptualandmethodologicaldifficultiesarisewhenap-plyingtheconcepttomultiplecountries.thedifficultyisnotuniquetoMeyer.anotherattemptatevaluatingthestrengthofaeuropeanstra-tegicculturesuffersfromconceptualandmethodologicalchallengessimilartothosethatcharacterizeMeyer’sstudy.43despitestakingaclaimwithinthe“modernist”constructivistcamp(p.5)àlaschimmelfennig,Katzenstein,finnemore,andcheckel,amongothers,andself-consciouslyadoptingabroadlypositivistepis-temology,thebookissurprisinglyatheoretical.evenwhenMeyerar-ticulatestestablehypotheses,thereislittleattemptatexplaininghowallthevariablesandpropositionshangtogether.Moreover,thehypoth-esesor“testablepropositions”thatareadvancedareofteninnowayuniquetoconstructivisttheorizingorclearlydistinguishedordistin-guishablefromtheexpectationsofothertheoreticalperspectivesinir.forexample,MeyerstatesthatBritain,france,germany,andpolandhavea“fadingattachment”toterritorialdefensetodayascomparedwiththeirorientationsduringthecoldwarperiodandthatanew“nor-mativeconsensus”hasemergedregardingperceptionsofexternalse-curitythreats.however,thiscanbeequallyandperhapsmoreeasilyexplainedbyrationalistandmaterialistapproaches.Indeed,itwouldbeastonishing(orproofofseriousparanoiaandpoorpoliticalleadership)ifthesecountriesfeltthesameoranincreasedperceptionofthreattotheirterritorialsecuritynowthatthecoldwarisoverandthesovietunionandtheWarsawpactaregone.asecond,relatedproblemistheabsenceofanyconsiderationorex-plicittestingofalternativeexplanations.onegetsthesensethatthereisageneraldissatisfactionwithpoliticalrealism,particularlystructuralrealism,butthereishardlyanydiscussionofspecificallywhyrealismisunsatisfactoryandwhytheuseofstrategicculturewillhelpusarriveatmorecomplete,accurate,andrigorousexplanationsoftheseimportant42see,forexample,Johnston1998;Katzenstein1996;Kier1997;Krotzforthcoming.43giegerich2006. 568worldpoliticsdevelopments.theresultisanapparentunwillingnesseithertosubjectclaimstoempiricaldisconfirmationortodemonstratewhythisframe-workoffersabetterexplanationcomparedwiththealternatives.third,thereisalsoanissueoftautologyorcircularityinthebookthatappliestheconceptofstrategicculturetoeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.44forexample,normativeconvergenceleadstochang-ingthreatperceptionsorchangingattitudesaboutthelegitimateuseofmilitaryforce.Meyerusestheseinturnasevidenceforevolvingnor-mativeconvergence.strategicculturecanbeusedaseitheranindepen-dentoradependentvariable,dependingonone’sresearchobjective.therelationshipbetweenthetwoisnotalwaysclearintheworkcon-sideredhere.Itistruethatthetwocouldbe“co-constituted,”butonewouldthenhavetoshowspecificfeedbackmechanismslinkingstrate-giccultureasanindependentandanoutcomevariable,respectively.Inaddition,itremainsunclearwherestrategiccultureislocatedandhowitsimpactshouldbemeasuredorempiricallydocumented.thismightbebecausewhatrepresentsstrategiccultureisnotconsistentthroughoutMeyer’sbook.Infact,toassessthestrengthofnormativechange,Meyerusesdifferentproxiesforeachofhisthreeempiricalchapters.toassesschangingthreatperceptionsinresponsetoboththeendofthecoldwarandtheriseofIslamistterrorism,Meyerfocusesonexistingpublicopinionsurveys.onethusinfersthatpublicopinionrepresentsorreflectsstrategicculture.toassesschangingnormsontheuseofforce(particularlyinresponsetocasesofethnicconflictandhumanrightsabuses)andmultilateralism,Meyerconductsacontentanalysisofnationalnewspapers,offeringanecdotalevidencethatanor-mativeshiftemergedfollowingthewarsinBosniaandKosovo.onethusinfersthatnewspapereditorialsreflectstrategicculture.toevalu-atewhethertheriseofnewsecurityinstitutionsactstosocializeagentsoperatingwithinthem,Meyerusesresponsestoquestionnaires.onethusinfersthatthedegreetowhichinstitutionalsocializationoccursreflectsthestrengthofstrategicculture.however,asInternationalInstitutionsandSocializationinEuropedemonstrates,noneofthesecriticismsorshortcomingsisinherenttoconstructivismassuchortoapplicationsofconstructivistthought.ex-ploringhowinstitutionsineuropesocializestatesandstateagents,Jeffreycheckelandcontributorsprovideconceptuallyandmethod-ologicallyrigorousconstructivistresearch.thevolume’sbasicproposi-tionisthatinternationalinstitutionsaresocialenvironmentsandthat44forasharpcritiquealongsuchlines,seefoucault,Mérand,andIrondelle2010. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy569participationinthemmaysocializebothindividualpolicymakersandstates;institutionscanhaveconstitutiveaswellasconstrainingeffects(p.19).checkeldefinessocializationas“aprocessofinductingactorsintothenormsandrulesofagivencommunity”(p.5).hedistinguishesbe-tweentwotypesofsocialization.typeIsocializationisthemovementfrominstrumentalrationalitytotheconsciousadoptionofnewroles.typeIIsocializationsignifieschangesinvaluesandinterestsorwhen“agentsacceptcommunityororganizationalnormsas‘therightthingtodo’”(p.6).Byadoptingtherulesofthebroadercommunity,theac-tororagentmovesfromalogicofconsequencestoalogicofappropri-ateness.45checkelfurtheridentifiesthreeseparatecausalmechanismsthatinducechange:strategiccalculation,roleplaying,andnormativesuasion(pp.9–16,243–51).theindividualchaptersapplythisframeworktothesocializingef-fectsofseveralinstitutionsineurope,includingnato,thecouncilofeurope,andtheosce.Interestingly,theresultsofinstitutionalizationarelargelyconsistentwithMeyer’sfindings.the“empiricalstudiesdemonstratethatthesocializingeffectsofeuropeaninstitutionsareunevenandoftensurprisinglyweak,andinnowaycanbeconstruedasshapinganew,post-nationalidentity”(p.16).unfortunately,nochap-terlookedspecificallyatcfsporesdp.ItwouldhavebeeninstructivetocomparethefindingswiththoseofMeyerandsmith.46wherethefieldstandsthesebooksandarticlesrepresentadecisivedevelopmentinthelit-eratureoneuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.examinedtogether,theyprovideanumberoflessonsandinsights.first,acrosstheoreticalperspectives,aconsensushasemergedthateuropeanstateshavesuc-ceededinestablishingadegreeofcooperationinforeignpolicy,secu-rity,anddefensethatishistoricallyunprecedented.second,thereisbasicdisagreementregardingwhichfactorsaredrivingandthusaremostimportantforexplainingtheapparentcon-solidationofpolicy-makingattheeuropeanlevel.thatwefindsuchdisagreementacrossworksrootedindifferenttheoreticalorintellectual45Marchandolsen2006.46Inadditiontotheconstructivistapproachesoutlinedinthissection,politicalsociologyhasen-teredthefieldaswell.situatedinabroaderargumentaboutstatetransformation,esdp,becauseitcutstotheheartofstatesovereignty,redefinesthewayinwhicheuropeansthinkaboutthestateinthetwenty-firstcentury.forthefirsttimeinnearlyfivecenturies,accordingtothisview,elitesandtheeuropeanpublicnolongerviewdefenseasafundamentalpartofstateidentity.seeMérand2008. 570worldpoliticstraditionsshouldnotbesurprising.Whatisremarkable,however,arethestrikingdifferenceswithinthesamemacroperspective,realisminparticular.somerealistsattributetheriseineuropeansecuritycooperationtoadesireforenhancedautonomyfromtheunitedstatesandagreaterprofileinworldpolitics.otherspointtotraditionalbalanceofpowerdynamics(aresponsetoamericanunipolarity).some,suchasJones,leaveoutbalancingdynamicsaltogether.yetanotherreasonrealistsciteisadesiretoavoidapotentialregionalsecuritydilemmaandtobindgermanyintoeuropeaninstitutions.Institutionalistsplacedif-feringemphasesontherelativeimportanceoflogicsofconsequencesversuslogicsofappropriatenessdrivingcooperation,aswellastheroleofpath-dependentversussociologicalprocessesforinstitutionalevolu-tionandadaptation.constructivistsdivergeonhowdeeplyinstitutionssocializeactorsandoverwhatmattersmostinreshapingtheregion’spoliticalcharacter:socializationthroughinternationalinstitutionsornormativeconvergenceotherwisedriven.third,whiletheworksdiscussedheredemonstratethateuropeanforeign,security,anddefensepolicyhassignificantlyexpandedandconsolidatedoverthepastfifteenyears,marshalingabroadrangeofcausalfactorsandexplanationsforwhythishashappened,noneoftheauthorsaddressesthequestionofwhycooperationworksatsometimesonsomeissuesbutnotonothers.forexample,whiletheeuwasabletoadoptacommonpositioninresponsetothesix-daywarbetweenrussiaandgeorgiainaugust2008,includingsendinganeumis-siontogeorgiatomonitorrussia’spromiseoftroopwithdrawalfromgeorgiaproper,eustatesarestilldividedonrecognizingKosovo’sin-dependence.Itisnotclearhowtheauthorswouldexplainsuchvariation:thestartsandstopsofintegrationorwhycooperationonforeignandsecu-ritypolicyseemstoebbandflow.ratherthanmovinginalinearfash-ion,progresstowardconsolidatingamorecohesiveeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicyhasbeenunevenandhasmovedinanumberofsuccessivephases,markedbyincrementalsuccessesbuildingonma-jorfailures.47thisreturnsustothequestionraisedearlier:whydoeseuropeancooperationinforeignpolicy,security,anddefenseseemtoworkandholdtogetherinsomepoliticalinstancesbutnotinothers?theextantresearchinthisnewfieldhasnotyetseriouslyconsideredorevenacknowledgedthisquestion.theorizingonthesestartsandstopswillfurtherstrengthentheburgeoningfieldinthefuture.47Wallace2005. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy571fourth,itisalsoworthnotingwhatiscurrentlymissinginthislit-erature.todate,thereisnomajortheoreticalworkapplyingliberalirtheorytoincreasedeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicycooperation.aliberalirtheorymightstresshowdomesticandtransnationalso-cietalcoalitions,interdependence,domesticinstitutions,andperhapsvaluesshapestatepreferencesandmakecooperationmorelikely.suchaliberalapproachwouldalsolikelyseethepurposeofeu-ropeancooperationinmuchdifferenttermsthanthatofarealistap-proach,forexample.Itwouldplacelessemphasisoneurope’smilitarycapabilitiesandadvantagesandinsteadhighlighteurope’ssoftpowerappealanditsabilitytoattractothers,particularlythosestatesoneu-rope’speripherythatonedayhopeforeumembership.asMoravcsiksays,“despiteitssubstantialmilitaryassets,europe’struegeopoliticalcomparativeadvantageliesinprojectingcivilianinfluence:economicinfluence,internationallaw,‘smart’and‘soft’power.”48finally,anothernotablefeatureofthisliteratureconcernsthenatureofcausalexplanation.Mostargumentsinthisnewfieldtendtoadoptazero-sumforminwhichcooperationderivesfrominternationalorregionalpressures,orinstitutionalization,orcultureandidentity.Inrealpoliticallife,anysensibleobserverwouldlikelyagreethattheincreaseinthescopeandintensityofcooperationisprobablyshapedbymorethanoneofthesefactors,perhapsbyallofthem.theremightevenbeanelementofoverdetermination.themoreinterestingquestionishowthesevariousfactorsinteractwitheachother,howandpossiblyinwhatordertheycombinetoes-tablishcausaleffect,andhowmucheachfactororvariableexplainsin-dividually.thedegreetowhichmovingbeyondmonocausalargumentsorexplanationsmoreorlesscleanlyrootedinonemacroperspectiveorparadigmandthedegreetowhichanalyticeclecticismmighthelptoarriveathistoricallyandpoliticallymoreexhaustiveexplanationsofferaninterestingtheoreticalpuzzlethatarisesfromtheseworks.thesearequestionsthatfuturescholarshipintheareawilllikelyconsider.49conclusion:theoreticalpromiseandpoliticalimportancethepastdecadehaswitnessedtheadventofanewareaofresearchthathasmergedthestudyofeuropeanintegrationintheareasoftradi-tional“highpolitics”withinternationalrelationstheory.scholarshave48Moravcsik2009,409–10.forabasicoutlineofwhataliberalirtheoryofeuropeanforeign,security,anddefensepolicycouldlooklike,seeMoravcsik2009,409–10;henke2010.49on“analyticeclecticism,”seesilandKatzenstein2010. 572worldpoliticsidentifiedawiderangeoffactorstoexplaintheriseofeuropeanfor-eignpolicy,security,anddefensecooperation.thismayreflectthemul-tiplicityofforcesatworkandthemanydimensionsthatthesechangesineuropeanaffairsimply,aswellasthediversityofinternationalrela-tionstheoryandthefield’sinfancy.thenewfieldoffersanumberofpromisingtheoreticalopeningsinareasofgreatpoliticalimportance.Bringinggeneralirtheorytothestudyofeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicyholdsclearbenefitsforisolatingkeyfactorsthatcanpotentiallyleadtogreatercooperationorintegrationinthesedomains.Butwhataboutthereverse?Whatmightthestudyofeuropeaninte-grationinsecurityanddefenseoffertoirandsocialsciencetheory?Willtherebenew,meaningfulcontributionsorreappraisalsofsomeofthecentralfeatures,concepts,andconventionalwisdomsofmajortheo-riesortheoreticalparadigms?sincetheseventeenthcenturyeuropeanpoliticshasprovidedirwithsomeofitscoreconceptsandtheories:themodernterritorialstate,thebalanceofpower,deterrence,alliancepolitics,majoraspectsofpowertransitiontheory,thesecuritydilemma,basicapproachestoregionalintegration,offense-defensetheory,andnationalismandideology.Willsimilartheoreticaloranalyticalbreak-throughsoccurbystudyingeuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicyoftheearlytwenty-firstcentury?europeanforeignandsecuritypolicycooperationseemstobeaqualitativelynewformofresilientandevolvingcooperationbetweenstatesintheseareas.Itisnotsimplyaframeworkofcollectivesecurity,noraconventionalmilitaryalliance,norjustanewtypeoftwenty-firstcenturyeuropeanconcert.Willthissysteminsecurityandde-fensefurtherconsolidateintoadistinctregionalpolityandmachineryofpolicy-making—andthusoffernewwaysoftheorizinginternationalaffairs?orwillit,littlebylittle,turnintoacohesivepan-europeanac-torin“highpolitics”thatresemblesclassicnation-statesyetonalargerscale—andthusoffernewterrainfortheorizingfull-scaleregionalin-tegrationinforeignpolicy,security,anddefense?Whatishighlylikelyisthateurope’sroleinworldpoliticswilllargelybedefinedbyeurope’smostpowerfulstatesinpursuitoftheirowninterests,perhapsalongwiththeincreasinginvolvementofvariouseuropean-levelinstitutionsandoffices,bothintergovernmentalandsupranational.takingdomesticpoliticsmoresystematicallyintoaccount—whetherviewedthroughhistoricalinstitutionalist,constructivist,orrationalistlenses—couldbeoneofthemoresignificantcontributionsofthisnewfieldtothestudyofinternationalrelations.europeanstatesaredemoc-racies,andthuspoliticalleadersareaccountabletotheirpublics.Inthe irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy573safe,secure,andprosperouseu,foreign,security,anddefensepolicyisinimportantwaysafunctionofdomesticpolitics.Whilethetalley-rands,Metternichs,castlereaghs,andBismarcksofeuropeanhistory(andthemanyminorfiguresalongside)maynothavehadtobotherwithtriflessuchasdomesticpressures,democraticconstitutionalar-rangements,orpublicopinion,thisclearlyisnotthecasefortoday’spoliticalleaders.systematictestingoftheroleofdomesticpolitics,presumablyinassociationwithregionalandsystemwidefactorsandforces,promisestohelpthefieldtoarriveatmorecomprehensiveandrobusttheoreticalknowledge.Beyondthetheoreticalpromiseofthesubjectmatter,thereisitsba-sicpoliticalimportance.thefateofeuropeancooperationinthefor-eignpolicy,security,anddefensedomainswillbecrucialifeuropeistofinditsplaceand,onewayoranother,defineitsroleintheworld.Inonesenseperhaps,europeangovernmentstodayfaceadecisionsimilartotheonetheunitedstatesfacedinthe1940s:toboosttheirstrategicmeanstomatchtheirexpandingcollectiveforeignpolicygoalsortoscaledowntheirambitionstomatchtheirlimitedcapabilities.europeisunlikelytobeabletoaffordtoavoidthisissueindefinitelyandwilleventuallyhavetoconfrontit.europewillalsohavetoacceptthatanincreasedroleworldwidepotentiallyinvolvespainfulcostsandrisks,anditwillhavetodeterminewhichmightbetolerableandwhichun-acceptable.oneofthemostnoteworthydevelopmentsineuropeanforeignandsecurityaffairsisthatlongtimeobserversofeuropeanpol-iticshavebeguntoreflectonwhataeuropeangrandstrategyshouldbe—andcouldbe.50argumentsoverthepurposeandendsofeuropeanforeignpolicyandsecuritycooperationwillcontinue,notonlyamongscholarsoper-atingfromsimilarordifferenttheoreticalorientationsbutalsoamongpractitionersandpolicymakersacrossthepoliticalspectrum,andatthenationalandsupranationallevels,promotingtheirpreferredvisionofeuropeasapoliticalproject.similarly,thefinalityissue—whereeuro-peanforeignpolicy,security,anddefensecooperation,aswellaseuro-peanintegrationatlarge,areultimatelyheaded—willinvolvepoliticaldecisions.Inanycase,aeuropemoreorlesscohesiveinforeignpolicy,security,anddefensewouldmarkadramaticshiftfromwhateuropehasexpe-riencedoverthepasttwocenturies—whethernineteenth-century-stylebalancing,greatpowerconcert,warringagainsteachother,orloosely50forexample,howorth2009;howorth2010;Vennesson2010. 574worldpoliticscoordinatinginmattersofforeignandsecuritypolicy.suchaeuropewouldalsomarkasignificantfeatureofthebasiccharacterofworldpoliticsinthedecadesandcenturyahead.referencesabdelal,rawi.2010.“theprofitsofpower:commercialrealpolitikineuropeandeurasia.”harvardBusinessschoolWorkingpaper,no.11-028.cam-bridge:harvardBusinessschool.art,robertJ.2004.“europehedgesItssecurityBets.”Int.V.paul,JamesJ.Wirtz,andMichelfortmann,eds.,BalanceofPowerRevisited:TheoryandPracticeinthe21stCentury.stanford,calif.:stanforduniversitypress.———.2005–6.“correspondence:strikingtheBalance.”InternationalSecurity30,no.3(Winter):177–96.Bindi,federiga,ed.2010.TheForeignPolicyoftheEuropeanUnion:AssessingEu-rope’sRoleintheWorld.Washington,d.c.:BrookingsInstitutionpress.Brooks,stepheng.,andWilliamc.Wohlforth.2005.“hardtimesforsoftBalancing.”InternationalSecurity30,no.1(summer):72–108.———.2008.WorldOutofBalance:InternationalRelationsandtheChallengeofAmericanPrimacy.princeton:princetonuniversitypress.Buchan,david.2009.EnergyandClimateChange:EuropeattheCrossroads.ox-ford:oxforduniversitypress.Butterfield,herbert.1951.HistoryandHumanRelations.london:collins.checkel,Jeffreyt.,andpeterJ.Katzenstein,eds.2009.EuropeanIdentity.cam-bridge:cambridgeuniversitypress.chivvis,christophers.2010.EUCivilianCrisisManagement:TheRecordSoFar.santaMonica,calif.:rand.christiansen,thomas,KnuderikJørgensen,andantjeWiener,eds.2001.TheSocialConstructionofEurope.london:sage.collard-Wexler,simon.2006.“Integrationunderanarchy:neorealismandtheeuropeanunion.”EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations12,no.3(sep-tember):397–432.cooper,robert.2004.TheBreakingofNations:OrderandChaosintheTwenty-firstCentury.newyork:grove.cowles,Mariagreen,Jamescaporaso,andthomasrisse,eds.2001.Transform-ingEurope:EuropeanizationandDomesticChange.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluni-versitypress.deutsch,KarlW.1954.PoliticalCommunityattheInternationalLevel:ProblemsofDefinitionandMeasurement.gardencity,n.y.:doubleday.———.1963.TheNervesofGovernment:ModelsofPoliticalCommunicationandControl.london:collier-Macmillan.deutsch,KarlW.,sidneya.Burrell,roberta.Kann,Jr.,Mauricelee,Martinlichterman,raymonde.lindgren,francisl.loewenheim,andrichardW.VanWagenen.1957.PoliticalCommunityandtheNorthAtlanticArea:Interna-tionalOrganizationintheLightofHistoricalExperience.princeton:princetonuniversitypress. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy575eldredge,niles,andstephenJ.gould.1972.“punctuatedequilibria:analter-nativetophyleticgradualism.”InthomasJ.M.schopf,ed.,ModelsinPaleo-biology.sanfrancisco:freeman.etzioni,amitai.1965.PoliticalUnification:AComparativeStudyofLeadersandForces.newyork:holt,rinehart,andWinston.———.2001.PoliticalUnificationRevisited:OnBuildingSupranationalCommu-nities.lanham,Md.:lexingtonBooks.europeancommission.2003.“asecureeuropeinaBetterWorld.”Manuscript,Brussels.europeancouncil.2010.“projecteurope2030:challengesandopportunities.”Manuscript,Brussels.fearon,James,andalexanderWendt.2002.“rationalismv.constructivism:askepticalView.”InWaltercarlsnaes,thomasrisse,andBetha.simmons,eds.,HandbookofInternationalRelations.london:sage.fligstein,neil,Waynesandholtz,andalecstonesweet,eds.2001.TheInstitu-tionalizationofEurope.newyork:oxforduniversitypress.foucault,Martial,frédéricMérand,andBastienIrondelle.2010.“publicsupportforeuropeandefense:doesstrategiccultureMatter?”paperpresentedattheconferenceofthecouncilforeuropeanstudies,Montréal,canada,april15–17.galtung,Johann.1973.TheEuropeanCommunity:ASuperpowerintheMaking.london:allenandunwin.giegerich,Bastian.2006.EuropeanSecurityandStrategicCulture:NationalRe-sponsestotheEU’sSecurityandDefencePolicy.Baden-Baden:nomos.ginsberg,roy.2001.TheEuropeanUnioninInternationalPolitics:BaptismbyFire.lanham,Md.:rowmanandlittlefield.glaser,charlesl.1997.“thesecuritydilemmarevisited.”WorldPolitics50,no.1(october):171–201.goldstein,Judithl.,MilesKahler,roberto.Keohane,andanne-Marieslaugh-ter,eds.2001.LegalizationandWorldPolitics.cambridge:mitpress.gordon,philiph.1997–98.“europe’suncommonforeignpolicy.”InternationalSecurity22,no.3(Winter):74–100.gordon,philiph.,andJeremyshapiro.2004.AlliesatWar:America,Europe,andtheCrisisoverIraq.newyork:Mcgraw-hill.grieco,Joseph.1995.“theMaastrichttreaty,economicandMonetaryunion,andtheneorealistresearchprogramme.”ReviewofInternationalStudies21,vol.1(January):21–40.———.1996.“stateInterestsandInstitutionalruletrajectories:aneorealistInterpretationoftheMaastrichttreatyandeuropeaneconomicandMon-etaryunion.”SecurityStudies5,no.3(spring):176–222.haas,ernstB.1958.TheUnitingofEurope:Political,Economic,andSocialForces,1950–1957.stanford,calif.:stanforduniversitypress.———.1975.TheObsolescenceofRegionalIntegrationTheory.Berkeley,calif.:In-stituteofInternationalstudies.haftendorn,helga,roberto.Keohane,andcelestea.Wallander,eds.1999.ImperfectUnions:SecurityInstitutionsoverTimeandSpace.newyork:oxforduniversitypress. 576worldpoliticshall,petera.,androsemaryc.r.taylor.1996.“politicalscienceandthethreenewInstitutionalisms.”PoliticalStudies44,no.5:936–57.henke,Marinae.2010.“aliberal-Intergovernmentaltheoryofeuropeanse-curitycooperation.”Manuscript,princetonuniversity.herz,Johnh.1950.“IdealistInternationalismandthesecuritydilemma.”WorldPolitics2,no.2(January):157–80.hill,christopher.1993.“thecapability-expectationsgap,orconceptualizingeurope’sInternationalrole.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies31,no.3(sep-tember):305–28.hill,christopher,andKarene.smith,eds.2000.EuropeanForeignPolicy:KeyDocuments.london:routledge.hoffmann,stanley.1966.“obstinateorobsolete?thefateofthenationstateandthecaseofWesterneurope.”Daedalus95,no.3:862–915.———.1982.“reflectionsonthenation-stateinWesterneuropetoday.”Jour-nalofCommonMarketStudies21,no.1(september):21–38.———.2000.“towardsacommoneuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy?”JournalofCommonMarketStudies38,no.2(June):189–98.hooghe,liesbet,andgaryMarks.2001.Multi-LevelGovernanceandEuropeanIntegration.lanham,Md.:rowmanandlittlefield.howorth,Jolyon.2000.“Britain,france,andtheeuropeandefenceInitiative.”Survival42,no.2(January):33–55.———.2009.“Implementinga‘grandstrategy.’”InÁlvarodeVasconcelos,ed.,WhatAmbitionsforEuropeanDefencein2020?paris:europeanunionInstituteforsecuritystudies.———.2010.“theeuasaglobalactor:grandstrategyforaglobalgrandBargain.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies48,no.3(June):455–74.howorth,Jolyon,andanandMenon.2009.“stillnotpushingBack:WhytheeuropeanunionIsnotBalancingtheunitedstates.”JournalofConflictReso-lution53,no.5(october):727–44.hyde-price,adrian.2006.“‘normative’powereurope:arealistcritique.”Jour-nalofEuropeanPublicPolicy13,no.2(March):217–34.Jachtenfuchs,Markus.2001.“thegovernanceapproachtoeuropeanIntegra-tion.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies39,no.2(June):245–64.Jervis,robert.1978.“cooperationunderthesecuritydilemma.”WorldPolitics30,no.2(January):167–214.Johnston,alastairIain.1998.CulturalRealism:StrategicCultureandGrandStrat-egyinChineseHistory.princeton:princetonuniversitypress.Katzenstein,peterJ.1976.DisjoinedPartners:AustriaandGermanysince1815.Berkeley:universityofcaliforniapress.———.1996.CulturalNormsandNationalSecurity.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluni-versitypress.———.2005.AWorldofRegions:AsiaandEuropeintheAmericanImperium.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.Katznelson,Ira,andBarryr.Weingast,eds.2005.PreferencesandSituations:PointsofIntersectionbetweenHistoricalandRationalChoiceInstitutionalism.newyork:russellsage.Keukeleire,stephan,andJenniferMacnaughtan.2008.TheForeignPolicyoftheEuropeanUnion.Basingstokeandnewyork:palgraveMacmillan. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy577Kier,elizabeth.1997.ImaginingWar:FrenchandBritishMilitaryDoctrinebetweentheWars.princeton:princetonuniversitypress.Kissinger,henry.2001.DoesAmericaNeedaForeignPolicy?TowardaDiplomacyforthe21stCentury.newyork:simonandschuster.Krasner,stephend.1984.“approachestothestate:alternativeconceptionsandhistoricaldynamics.”ComparativePolitics16,no.2(January):223–46.———.1988.“sovereignty:anInstitutionalperspective.”ComparativePoliticalStudies21,no.1(april):66–94.Krotz,ulrich.2007.“parapublicunderpinningsofInternationalrelations:thefranco-germanconstructionofeuropeanizationofaparticularKind.”Euro-peanJournalofInternationalRelations13,no.3(september):385–417.———.2009.“MomentumandImpediments:WhyeuropeWon’temergeasafullpoliticalactorontheWorldstagesoon.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies47,no.3(June):555–78.———.2010.“regularizedIntergovernmentalism:france-germanyandBeyond(1963–2009).”ForeignPolicyAnalysis6,no.2(June):147–85.———.2011.FlyingTiger:InternationalRelationsTheoryandthePoliticsofAd-vancedWeapons.newyork:oxforduniversitypress.———.forthcoming.HistoryandForeignPolicyinFranceandGermany.Basing-stokeandnewyork:palgraveMacmillan.Kupchan,charlesa.2002.TheEndoftheAmericanEra:U.S.ForeignPolicyandtheGeopoliticsoftheTwenty-firstCentury.newyork:Knopf.———.2003.“theriseofeurope,america’schangingInternationalism,andtheendofu.s.primacy.”PoliticalScienceQuarterly118,no.2(summer):205–31.larat,fabrice,andBeateKohler-Koch,eds.2009.EuropeanMultilevelGover-nance:ContrastingImagesinNationalResearch.cheltenham:edwardelgar.leiber,Keira.,andgeraldalexander.2005.“WaitingforBalancing:WhytheWorldIsnotpushingBack.”InternationalSecurity30,no.1(summer):109–39.lundestad,geir.1998.“Empire”byIntegration:TheUnitedStatesandEuropeanIntegration,1945–1997.newyork:oxforduniversitypress.———.2003.TheUnitedStatesandWesternEuropesince1945:From“Empire”byInvitationtoTransatlanticDrift.newyork:oxforduniversitypress.Maher,richard.2011.“friendsandrivals:WhyalliesdisagreeonMajorsecu-rityIssues.”ph.d.diss.,Brownuniversity.March,Jamesg.,andJohanp.olsen.2006.“thelogicofappropriateness.”Inrobertgoodin,MichaelMoran,andMartinrein,eds.,HandbookofPublicPolicy.oxford:oxforduniversitypress.Mcnamara,Kathleen.1999.TheCurrencyofIdeas:MonetaryPoliticsintheEuro-peanUnion.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.Mearsheimer,John.1990.“Backtothefuture:InstabilityineuropeafterthecoldWar.”InternationalSecurity15,no.1(summer):5–56.Mérand,frédéric.2008.EuropeanDefencePolicy:BeyondtheNationState.newyork:oxforduniversitypress.Mérand,frédéric,Martialfoucault,andBastienIrondelle,eds.2011.EuropeanSecuritysincetheFalloftheBerlinWall.toronto:universityoftorontopress.Meunier,sophie.2007.TradingVoices:TheEuropeanUnioninInternationalCom-mercialNegotiations.princeton:princetonuniversitypress. 578worldpoliticsMoravcsik,andrew.1991.“negotiatingthesingleeuropeanact:nationalInter-estsandconventionalstatecraftintheeuropeancommunity.”InternationalOrganization45,no.1(Winter):19–56.———.1993.“preferencesandpowerintheeuropeancommunity:aliberalIntergovernmentalistapproach.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies31,no.4(december):473–524.———.1997.“takingpreferencesseriously:aliberaltheoryofInternationalpolitics.”InternationalOrganization51,no.4(autumn):513–53.———.1998.TheChoiceforEurope:SocialPurposeandStatePowerfromMessinatoMaastricht.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.———.2009.“europe:theQuietsuperpower.”FrenchPolitics7,no.3–4:403–22.———.2010a.“europe,thesecondsuperpower.”CurrentHistory(March):91–98.———.2010b.“europe:risingsuperpowerinaBipolarWorld.”Inalanalex-androffandandrewcooper,eds.,RisingStates,RisingInstitutions.Washing-ton,d.c.:BrookingsInstitutionpress.nuttall,simon.1992.EuropeanPoliticalCo-operation.oxford:oxforduniversitypress.parsons,craig.2003.ACertainIdeaofEurope.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.pierson,paul.1996.“thepathtoeuropeanIntegration:ahistoricalInstitution-alistanalysis.”ComparativePoliticalStudies29,no.2:123–63.———.2004.PoliticsinTime:History,Institutions,andSocialAnalysis.princeton:princetonuniversitypress.posen,Barryr.2006.“europeanunionsecurityanddefensepolicy:responsetounipolarity?”SecurityStudies15,no.2(July):149–86.puchala,donaldJ.1970.“Integrationanddisintegrationinfranco-germanre-lations,1954–1965.”InternationalOrganization24,no.2(spring):183–208.risse,thomas.2010.ACommunityofEuropeans?TransnationalIdentitiesandPublicSpheres.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.rosato,sebastian.2010.EuropeUnited:PowerPoliticsandtheMakingoftheEuro-peanCommunity.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.sandholtz,Wayne,andalecstonesweet,eds.1998.EuropeanIntegrationandSupranationalGovernance.oxford:oxforduniversitypress.schelling,thomasc.1966.ArmsandInfluence.newhaven:yaleuniversitypress.schimmelfennig,frank.2003.TheEU,NATO,andtheIntegrationofEurope:RulesandRhetoric.newyork:cambridgeuniversitypress.schroeder,paulW.1994.TheTransformationofEuropeanPolitics,1763–1848.oxford:oxforduniversitypress.sil,rudra,andpeterJ.Katzenstein.2010.BeyondParadigms:AnalyticEclecticismintheStudyofWorldPolitics.Basingstokeandnewyork:palgraveMacmillan.smith,Karene.2008.EuropeanUnionForeignPolicyinaChangingWorld,2nded.cambridge:politypress.———.2010.GenocideandtheEuropeans.newyork:cambridgeuniversitypress.smith,Michaele.2000.“conformingtoeurope:thedomesticImpactofeu-ropeanforeignpolicycooperation.”JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy7,no.4(december):613–31. irtheory&europeanforeignpolicy579———.2001.“diplomacybydecree:thelegalizationofeuforeignpolicy.”JournalofCommonMarketStudies39,no.1(March):79–104.———.2004a.“Institutionalization,policyadaptation,andeuropeanforeignpolicycooperation.”EuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations10,no.1(March):95–136.———.2004b.“towardatheoryofeuropeanforeignpolicy-Making:Multi-levelgovernance,domesticpolitics,andnationaladaptationtoeurope’scommonforeignandsecuritypolicy.”JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy11,no.4(august):740–58.spinelli,altiero.1972.“thegrowthoftheeuropeanMovementsincethesec-ondWorldWar.”InMichaelhodges,ed.,EuropeanIntegration.harmond-worth:penguin.trachtenberg,Marc.1999.AConstructedPeace:TheMakingoftheEuropeanSettle-ment,1945–1963.princeton:princetonuniversitypress.Védrine,hubert.2001.FranceinanAgeofGlobalization.WithdominiqueMoïsi.trans.philiph.gordon.Washington,d.c.:BrookingsInstitutionpress.Vennesson,pascal.2010.“competingVisionsfortheeuropeanuniongrandstrategy.”EuropeanForeignAffairsReview15,no.1:57–75.Wallace,William.2005.“foreignandsecuritypolicy:thepainfulpathfromshadowtosubstance.”InhelenWallace,WilliamWallace,andMarka.pol-lack,eds.,Policy-MakingintheEuropeanUnion,5thed.oxford:oxforduni-versitypress.Walt,stephenM.1987.TheOriginsofAlliances.Ithaca,n.y.:cornelluniversitypress.Waltz,Kennethn.1986.“reflectionsonTheoryofInternationalPolitics:are-sponsetoMycritics.”Inroberto.Keohane,ed.,NeorealismandItsCritics.newyork:columbiauniversitypress.———.1993.“theemergingstructureofInternationalpolitics.”InternationalSecurity18,no.2(autumn):44–79.zielonka,Jan.1998.ExplainingEuro-Paralysis:WhyEuropeIsUnabletoActinInternationalPolitics.newyork:st.Martin’spress.