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论企业的公司治理和财务治理（CorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernanceinEnterprises）CorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernanceinEnterprisesAbstract:withthedeepeningofChina'seconomicsystemreform,theoriginalcorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernancemodelIthashinderedthedevelopmentoflistedcompanies,mainlyduetotheseriouslossofprincipalagentrelationshipunderthecontrolofinsidersTherefore,wemustperfectthegovernancestructureoflistedcompaniesassoonaspossiblesoastostrengthenfinancialgovernanceDKeywords:corporategovernance;financialgovernance;principalagentrelationshipFirst,therelationshipbetweencorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernance1.,corporategovernanceisthepremiseandtheoreticalbasisoffinancialgovernance,andenterprisesunderthecorporategovernancetheoryTheseparationofownershipandmanagementright,theprincipal-agenttheoryandthetheoryofasymmetricinformation Theownership,use,disposalandresidueofthecompany'spropertybetweentheownerandtheoperatorandbetweenthemanagersatdifferentlevelsThetheoryofbalancebetweendistributionandsupervisionandcontrol,whichisthepremiseoffinancialgovernancetheoryBasics。2.financialgovernancedependsongoodcorporategovernancemechanism.TheestablishmentofcorporatefinancialgovernancesystemdependsonCorporategovernanceenvironment,thusformingthecompany'sspecificfinancialgovernancemechanism.CorporatefinancialgovernanceenvironmentisthecompanyGovernanceenvironmentisatthebasiclevelofcorporatefinancialgovernancesystem,whichaffectsthedistributionoffinancialrightsofstakeholders,Thedivisionoffinancialrightsisdecided,andrelevantfinancialinstitutionsandsupervisioninstitutionsareestablishedaccordingly.Inshort,thereisnogoodpublicCorporategovernanceisdifficulttoplayaroleincorporategovernance.3.,financialgovernanceisaneffectivewaytoimprovecorporategovernance.Thetheoryofcorporategovernanceonresidualclaim TherealizationofcontrolpowerisrealizedthroughthechangeofthefinancialrightsdistributionamongthestakeholdersTherightconfigurationwillproducedifferent"incentivemechanism"and"opportunity"systemandtheefficiencyofcorporategovernanceislowandhighItdependsentirelyontheefficiencyoftheincentivemechanismandmonitoringmechanism,sogoodfinancialgovernanceistheimprovementofcorporategovernanceEffectivemeans.Two,thethreekindsofcorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernancemechanismcausedbytheprincipal-agentrelationshipTheseparationofownershipandmanagementrightsisthebasisofmoderncorporategovernance,andthe"insidercontrol"ishereBasedonthis,threeprincipalagentrelationshipsofmoderncorporationarederived:(1)investor(Institute)(b)theprincipalagentrelationshipbetweentheagentandtheagent;(2)thetrustbetweentheshareholderandthecreditorLegalrelationship;(3)theprincipal-agentrelationshipbetweencontrollinginvestors(majorshareholders)anddispersedinvestors(smallandmediumshareholders) TheDepartmentof.Inordertoadapttothethreeprincipalagentrelationshipsinmodernenterprise,theyareadaptedtoeachotherCorporategovernancemechanismandfinancialgovernancemodel:1.,theshareholderdominatedcorporategovernancemodelemphasizestheprotectionofshareholders'interestsintheUnitedStatesandbritain.InthiskindofIntheframeworkofcorporategovernancemodel,aseriesofmeasuresaredesignedtoprotectshareholders'rightsandinterests,andpayattentiontotheinterestsofshareholdersFullymobilizeandmotivatethemanagementsystemandsystem.ToadapttothecorporategovernancemodelistoemphasizeThemostimportantissueishowtodetermineorfindafinancialgovernancemodelaimingatmaximizingshareholderwealthMaketheshareholdersandoperatorsconsistentinterestsrange,improvefinancialefficiency.2.,thebankledcorporategovernancemodelrepresentedbyJapanandgermany.AndthecorporategovernancemodelItadaptstothefinancialgovernancemodelofdealingwiththerelationshipbetweenshareholdersandcreditors.Itfullyemphasizestheenterprise Dynamicfinancialinformationsothatcreditorscanmonitorthecompany'sfinancialaffairssoasnottodamagetheinterestsofcreditors.thisThefinancialgovernancemodelsmainlyfocusontheassetliabilityratio,theproportionofthecurrentassetsandsoonMeans.3.,thecorporategovernancemodeldominatedbysmallandmediuminvestorsandotherstakeholders.SuchcompanyThegovernancemodelismainlyaimedatthe"insidercontrol",fromtheperspectiveofwesterndevelopedcountries,"internal"Themainreasonforhumancontrolisthatwiththeexpansionofthescaleofthecompany,thedegreeofdecentralizationofownershipisbecominghigherandhigherSpecializationisbecomingstrongerandstronger,SothatmanagerswithprofessionalknowledgeandcanaffordhighmonitoringcostsThemajorityshareholdershavetheactualcontrolrightsoftheenterprise,andthesmallandmedium-sizedshareholderscannotpaythehighsupervisioncostAndwithoutprofessionalmanagementknowledge,informationis noteffective,anditsvotingrightsareinsignificant,soitwillbegenerallyTheactof"votingbyfoot"or"hitchhiking".Inthissituation,nomatterfromthetheoryofcorporategovernanceInfact,inthecorporategovernance,strengthenthesupervisionofcontrollingshareholdersandcorporateexecutives,Theindependentdirectorsystemisintroducedintothecorporategovernancemodel,andtheindependentdirectorisrelatedtothesmallandmedium-sizedshareholdersandotherinterestsTheagentinthecompanycannotserveanypositionexcepttheindependentdirector,andfullyguaranteetheindependentdirectorIndependence,inthiscorporategovernanceenvironment,enterprisesemphasizetheinterestsofallstakeholdersascorporatefinanceFinally,thepaperintroducesandemphasizesthefinancialreportingauditsystemofListedCompaniesincorporatefinancialgovernance.Three,theproblemsexistinginthecorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernanceofListedCompaniesinChinaTheproblemsinthecorporategovernanceofListedCompanies inChinaaremainlyreflectedintheproblemsofcorporategovernance:1.state-ownedsharesequityvacancy.TheprominentcharacteristicsoftheownershipstructureofListedCompaniesinChinaarestate-ownedsharesandlegalpersonsharesTheproportionistoolarge,theproportionofsocialpublicsharesissmall,andtheequityisdispersed.Becausethelistedcompaniesarestate-ownedsharesThestateoftheshareholderdoesnothavethepersonalityattribute,therefore,thestatemustentrusttheownershiptothedesignatedperson(general)Isthepersoninchargeoftheenterprise)toactasstate-ownedshareholdersrights,althoughtheseagentscanbecometheboardofdirectorsorAmemberoftheshareholders'meeting,butfundamentally,theyarenottheultimateowneroftheproperty,thesepeopleandtherealTheinterestfunctionofowners(state)isinconsistent,sotheycannotbelikerealshareholderstosomeextentConcernedabouttheoperationefficiencyofstate-ownedassetsandthevalueofstate-ownedassets.Therefore,theownershipofstate-ownedsharesismissingBithasbecometheprimaryproblemthatourlistedcompanies shouldsolveincorporategovernance.2.,theindependenceofindependentdirectorsystemisnotenough.TheindependentdirectorsysteminourcountryhasalreadybeenthestockmarketPlaceacceptance,buttheimplementationresultsarenotsatisfactory,thefundamentalreasonisthattheindependentdirectorsassmallandmedium-sizedshareholdersTheindependenceofinterestagentshasbeenquestioned.ThecompanylawofChinastipulatesthatindependentdirectorsshouldbechosenbytheshareholders'meetingHowever,becauseoftheparticularityofthecapitalstructureofthelistedcompaniesinourcountry,thestate-ownedsharesorlegalpersonsharesoccupyabsoluteorphaseTherefore,theelectionofindependentdirectorsisdecidedbytheagentofthelargestshareholderAccordingly,theindependenceoftheindependentdirectorisweakenedtosomeextent,sotheindependentdirectoris,tosomeextent,independentUnabletoundertakethesocialresponsibilityofrepresentingsmallandmedium-sizedshareholders.Atthesametime,asanimportantpartofcorporategovernance,financialgovernanceisalsodueto"insidercontrol"and"financialgovernance" Theseriousimbalancebetweentheprincipal-agentrelationshipmakesthefinancialmechanismcannotrunreasonably,andthefinancialgoalisdifficulttoachieve,Directlymanifestedinfourlevels:1.thequalityoffinancialinformationofListedCompaniesinChinaisnothigh.ThemostfundamentalleveloffinancialgovernanceisfinancialinformationQualitymanagement,someofourlistedcompaniesduetotheimperfectcorporategovernancestructure,resultinginimperfectmeTheseriousinformationqualityproblemsofListedCompaniesinChinaaremainlydueto"insidercontrol".CompanyclassicsThefinancialinformationprovidedbythecompanycannotreallyreflecttheoperationresultsoftheenterprise,Thefinancialsituation,theimportantfinancialrisk,financialmattersarenotdisclosedorvaguedisclosure,therebyerodingthecountryorThelegitimateinterestsofthepublicinvestors.Therefore,onlyaperfectcorporategovernancemechanismcanbeestablishedwiththisphaseAdaptivefinancialmanagementandsupervisionmechanism. 2.,becauseoftheseriousimbalanceoftheprincipal-agentrelationship,thedistortionofthecompany'sfinancialgovernancetargetiscaused.fromAlargeproportionofChina'slistedcompaniesarerestructuredbythestatekeyandlargestate-ownedenterprisesSomeenterprisesaregenerallydistributedinthestatekeyindustriesorfields,supportingthelifebloodofthenationaleconomy,butatthesametimeWithmultiplesocialresponsibilities,thisleadstothediversificationofthecorporategoalsoftheselistedcompaniesItisdecidedthattheenterprisefinancialgovernanceisnottomaximizetheprofitsofenterprises,buttomaximizethevalueofenterprises.Themaximizationofenterprisevalueshouldbeconsidered,suchasemployees,creditors,government,publicinvestors,consumersandsuppliersTosomeextent,itisrelatedtotheinterestsofenterprises,retailers,socialresponsibilityandsoonThedirectinterestofthemanageriscontradictory,andtheabsenceoftheownermakesiteasyfortheinternalcontrollertoachieveThepurposeofsacrificingpersonalinterestsforthebenefit ofsociety.3.,thecapitalstructureofthecompanyisunreasonable.Duetotheeffectivenessofcorporategovernance,toalargeextentItdependsonthecapitalstructureofthecompany,andthenaffectsthefinancialgovernancemodeoftheenterprise.Creditor'srightandsharerightcannotonlybeseenAsafinancingtoolandawayofgovernancethatcanreplaceeachother.ThemanagersofListedCompaniesinChinaareinvestingFinancingdecisionstendtochooseequityfinancingratherthanlowercostdebtfinancing,Becausethedebtfinancingallowsmanagerstobearthepressureofregularrepaymentandrepayment,theneedtorepaydebtcanbereducedAdebtcontractforcesmanagerstopaycashinthefuture,asmanagersseekopportunitiesfortheirownprofits(suchasallowances,etc.),Itreducesthefreecashflowthatmanagerscancontrol,thusreducingtheagencycostoffreecashflow.throughThepreferenceofdebtfinancingleadstothenonoptimalcapitalstructureofthecompany.4.weakentheauditsystemoffinancialstatementsoflisted companies.Thefinancialstatementisthemasterofthecompany'sdisclosureoffinancialinformationTomakethemajorityofstakeholdersunderstandthesituationoflistedcompanies,andmakethebasisforcorrectdecision-making.CSRCItisalsorequiredthatthelistedcompanyshouldbeapprovedbythegeneralmeetingofshareholderswhenhiringorchangingtheaccountingfirmPrincipalagentrelationshipbetweenshareholdersandaccountingfirms.Butbecauseofinsidercontrol,themanagerofthecompanyhasbeenAfterbecomingtheactualcontrollerofthecompany,theprincipal-agentrelationshiphasbeendistortedtobeemployedbythemanagerasanaccountantFirmsauditthemselves.Atthesametime,theauditbusinessofCPAfirmshasthephenomenonofoversupplyThereisaclearinterestrelationshipbetweentheaccountingfirmandthemanager.Four,furtherimproveourcorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernancerecommendations1.,improvetheinformationdisclosuresystemoflistedcompanies.Theinformationdisclosuresystemoflistedcompaniesincludesthefinancialaffairsoflistedcompanies Theformationofinformation(suchas:accountingregulations)andinformationreportingproceduresandothercomponents.InformationoflistedcompaniesDisclosuresystemplaysanimportantroleincorporategovernanceandfinancialgovernance.TimelyandeffectivedisclosureofcorporateinformationItwillmakethestakeholdersmaketherightdecision,avoidthelosscausedbytheinformationisnottimelyandasymmetric.Inaddition,forlistedcompaniesmajortransactionmatters,securitymatters,majorrelatedpartytransactionsandothereconomicbusinessindependenceThedirectorsmustpublishtheirindependentopinionssoastogivefullplaytothesupervisoryroleoftheindependentdirectorsinthedisclosureofaccountinginformation.AToreformtheCPAauditingsystemsoastoimprovetheindependenceandprofessionalabilityofCPAaudit,Theauditqualityofcertifiedpublicaccountantsshouldbestrengthenedtoensurethequalityofaccountinginformationdisclosure.2.,activelyandsteadilyimplementthesplitsharestructurereform.Atpresent,Chinahasstartedthepilotreformofsplitsharestructure, Inthereformofsplitsharestructure,howtodealwiththeinterestrelationshipbetweenstateshares,legalpersonsharesandsocialpublicsharesisanimportantissueThekeytosplitsharestructurereformisthatwemustaccuratelypredicttheexistingcapacityandpotentialabsorptionofChina'ssecuritiesmarketOnthebasisofquantityandnationalaffordability,thestockmarketvolatilityisgreatlyavoided,Turmoilinthestockmarket.Theimplementationofthesplitsharestructurereformwillhelptosolvetheabsenceofstate-ownedsharesinChinaThisphenomenonofinsidercontrol.Atthesametime,itgivesthemanagementdepartmentsofthestatetooperatestateassetsAllocationright,Theresponsibilityofthestate-ownedassetsmanagementdepartmentshouldbecorrespondingtotheincomeenjoyedbythestate-ownedassetsmanagementdepartment.3.,strengthentheindependenceandsupervisionofindependentdirectors.TheintroductionofindependentdirectorsysteminlistedcompaniesisperfectAsanimportantmeasureofcorporategovernancestructure,independentdirectorsshouldbeestablishedasindependentprinciple Inordertoavoidthenegativeeffectcausedbytheprincipal-agentrelationship,weshouldincreasetheindependentdirectorofthecompanyThenumberofindependentdirectorstoparticipateintheexerciseofcorporatesurpluscontrolrights,tosolvetheindependenceofthesystemTheissueoftherightofdirectorscanmakethemplayasupervisoryrole,andshouldalsosolvetheindependentdirectorsfromthesystemTheissueofremuneration,includingtheamountandsourceofindependentdirectors'remuneration,makesindependentdirectorsmoreindependent.Reference：1.LiShu.Accountingpolicychoicebasedoncorporategovernance.Accountingresearch,2003,(7)2.LiWeian.Studyonmoderncorporategovernance.Beijing:ChineseSocialSciencesPress,9003.3.DingZhiguo,GengZhen.ProblemsandCountermeasuresofcorporategovernanceinChina.Economicverticalandhorizontal,2005,(12).
